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1 
DOES JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE MATTER? A STUDY OF 
THE DETERMINANTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LITIGATION IN 
AN AUTHORITARIAN REGIME 
 
Wei Cui
*
 
 Lawsuits against the government form a part of the regular 
functioning of legal systems in democratic countries, and responding to 
such lawsuits an unavoidable part of governance. However, in the context 
of authoritarian regimes, administrative litigation has been viewed as a 
distinctively valuable institution for promoting the rule of law and 
individual rights. Moreover, the judiciary is portrayed as the keystone to 
this institution and to the rule of law in general: the more powerful and 
competent is the judiciary, the more it is able to “constrain government” 
through judicial review. Through empirical and comparative analyses of 
over two decades of administrative litigation in China against one of the 
state’s essential branches, tax collection, I challenge the utility of this 
normative conception of administrative litigation. Using conceptual tools 
that apply across legal systems and regulatory areas, I show that while 
litigant behavior as well the regulatory environment offer useful 
explanations of litigation patterns such as case volume and the plaintiff win 
rate, the relevance of judicial quality is barely discernible. This highlights 
the intuitive idea that judicial review can operate only when private parties 
bring suit, and whether and when they will do so cannot be taken for 
granted. In countries with weak legal systems, the rule of law may fail in 
certain basic ways that even a competent and well-subsidized judiciary 
cannot remedy. 
 
Key words: administrative litigation, judicial review, rule of law, tax 
litigation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In democracies with strong traditions of the rule of law, 
litigation against the government, while generating important bodies 
of case law for various areas of government activity, is not itself 
viewed as a yardstick for evaluating the performance of legal 
systems. In the United States, a probably widely-shared view about 
litigation against government agencies is expressed by Professors 
Theodore Eisenberg and Henry Farber: “We suspect that, on average, 
the federal government is less fearful of litigation than are private 
litigants. Government is, after all, as permanent a secular institution 
as we have and has been litigating for hundreds of years. Litigation 
to enforce laws and defend against attacks on laws and government 
policies is part of its routine. Government is so large relative to most 
other litigants that it, more than the average litigant, knows 
substantial litigation will be a part of its existence.”1 In other words, 
the occurrence of litigation to resolve disputes between the 
government and citizens is an epiphenomenal consequence of the 
 
1
 Theodore Eisenberg & Henry S. Farber, Government as Litigant: Further 
Tests of the Case Selection Model, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 94, 109 (2003).  
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general functioning of the legal system and the (wide) scope of 
government activities. One need not think of it as a distinct 
institution with a distinct purpose in itself.
2
 In countries with civil 
law traditions, a special judicial branch is often created to adjudicate 
lawsuits against the government: a special recognition for disputes 
between the government and private parties can thus be said to be 
institutionalized, somewhat in contrast with the U.S. and other 
common law countries.
3
 The existence of an administrative law 
branch of the judiciary, however, is not itself regarded as 
differentiating countries characterized by the rule of law from those 
that are not. 
In countries subject to authoritarian rule, by contrast, lawsuits 
against government agencies can assume a special symbolic status: 
they may be seen as providing rare instances of institutionalized 
constraint on the exercise of authoritarian power.
4
 Well-justified 
 
2
 Correspondingly it need not constitute a distinct subject of study. Thus in 
numerous quantitative studies of U.S. litigant behavior, lawsuits with government 
defendants are simply included as one type of litigation among many others. See 
Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue III, The Selection of Employment 
Discrimination Disputes for Litigation: Using Business Cycle Effects to Test the 
Priest-Klein Hypothesis, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 427 (1995); Peter Siegelman & Joel 
Waldfogel, Toward  a  Taxonomy of  Disputes:  New Evidence through the Prism 
of the Priest/Klein Model, 28 J. LEGAL. STUD. 101 (1999); Daniel Kessler et al., 
Explaining Deviations from the Fifty- Percent Rule: A Multimodal Approach to the 
Selection of Cases for Litigation, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 233 (1996). In the large 
empirical literature studying judicial attitudes, lawsuits against government 
agencies offer particularly germane material for the examination of the ideological 
leanings of judges (e.g. whether they are pro- or anti-government). For a review, 
see FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS (2007). 
But the fact that these lawsuits are brought to courts in the first place are taken for 
granted.  
3
 See, generally, ZAIM M. NEDJATI & J.E. TRICE, ENGLISH AND 
CONTINENTAL SYSTEMS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 35 (1979); Dominique Custos, 
Independent Administrative authorities in France: Structural and Procedural 
Change at the Intersection of Americanization, Europeanization and Gallicization, 
in COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 278 (Susan Rose-Ackerman & Peter L. 
Lindseth ed., 2010); Katharine Thompson & Brian Jones, Administrative Law in 
the United Kingdom, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: ITS 
MEMBER STATES AND THE UNITED STATES 177 (3d ed., René Seerden ed., 2012). 
4
 See, e.g. Kevin J. O’Brien & Lianjiang Li, Suing the Local State: 
Administrative Litigation in Rural China, 51 CHINA J. 75, 90-91 (2004); Tom 
Ginsburg, Administrative Law and the Judicial Control of Agents in Authoritarian 
Regimes, in RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 
(Tom Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa ed., 2008) (accessible at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2006538, all page citations below to this chapter are by 
reference to the SSRN version).  
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antipathy towards oppressive regimes that frequently trample rule of 
law norms has led legal professionals, scholars, the media and 
citizens in general to applaud lawsuits against the government 
(frequently labeled as “administrative litigation”) as a good thing in 
itself.
5
 Administrative litigation is thus strongly promoted by those 
who aspire to limit the power of bad government, especially when 
few other mechanisms of such constraint are available.
6
 Conversely, 
administration litigation has also been conceived as a distinct device 
with which the principals in an authoritarian regime can monitor 
their agents.
7
 Once such positive valence, or at least distinct 
institutional purpose, is attached to administrative litigation, it also 
becomes instinctive to view the quantity of such litigation as well as 
litigation outcomes as meaningful indicators of how well the 
institution is serving its purpose. In particular, lower-than-expected 
case volume and plaintiff win rates against the government are taken 
to reflect judicial weakness vis-a-vis the executive branch.  
As natural as such reasoning may seem, it faces some serious 
theoretical and methodological difficulties. To begin, there is no 
generally accepted theory predicting the quantity of litigation in a 
given jurisdiction, i.e. explaining why some countries are more 
“litigious than others”.8 Consequently, it can be difficult to justify the 
implicit benchmarks used in making judgments such as that the 
volume of litigation or the rate of plaintiff wins in a country is “too 
low”. In addition, with respect to the plaintiff win rates, the most 
compelling existing theory posits that the key determinant of such 
rates is the rate of settlement among litigants, which is itself 
determined by the abilities of litigants to predict judicial outcomes, 
 
5
 O’Brien and Li, supra note 4, at 103 (administrative litigation is a form of 
“rightful resistance”, which is “a form of popular contention that operates near the 
boundary of authorized channels, employs the rhetoric and commitments of the 
powerful to curb the exercise of power, hinges on locating and exploiting divisions 
within the state, and relies on mobilizing support from the wider public”). 
6
 Id (administrative litigation has led many “to reconsider their relationship 
to authority, while posing new questions, encouraging innovative tactics, and 
spurring thoughts about political change.”) 
7
 Ginsburg, supra note 4. 
8
 For recent discussions, see Theodore Eisenberg et al., Litigation as a 
Measure of Well-Being (Cornell Law Faculty Working Papers No. 99/Apr. 8, 
2012), available at http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clsops_papers/99; Mark 
Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Are Americans More Litigious? Some Quantitative 
Evidence, in THE AMERICAN ILLNESS 66 (Frank Buckley ed., 2013).  
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the cost of litigation, and the stakes the parties have in the disputes.
9
 
Plaintiff win rates, in other words, by themselves do little to answer 
questions about whether the judiciary tends to side with the 
government, or whether the legal standard in a given area of dispute 
is otherwise too favorable to the government.  
This Article explores these challenges facing the interpretation of 
the outcomes of administrative litigation in authoritarian regimes 
through an in-depth case study. I focus on one country, China, and 
litigation in one fundamental area of government activity, taxation. 
Because of its authoritarian government and weak rule of law,
10
 
administrative litigation in China has long been held as an emblem of 
instruments for constraining government. Ever since the 1980s, both 
Chinese and foreign scholars have resorted to the study of 
administrative litigation as a way of assessing the development of 
China’s legal system.11 Various authors have also held forth putative 
evidence of low case volumes and low plaintiff win rates as 
confirming the lack of independence on the part of the Chinese 
 
9
 George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for 
Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984); Joel Waldfogel, The Selection Hypothesis 
and the Relationship Between Trial and Plaintiff Victory, 103 J. POL. ECON. 229 
(1995); Joel Waldfogel, The Selection of Cases for Trial, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE 
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 419 (Peter Newman ed., 1998); Keith 
N. Hylton & Haizhen Lin, Trial Selection Theory and Evidence: A Review, in 8 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 487 (2d ed., Chris Sanchirico ed., 2012). 
10
 PITMAN POTTER, CHINA'S LEGAL SYSTEM 192-93 (2013); Benjamin J. 
Liebman, China’s Courts: Restricted Reform, 191 CHINA Q. 620 (2007); RANDALL 
PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARDS RULE OF LAW 247, 513 (2002); 
Stanley Lubman, Bird in a Cage: Chinese Law Reform after Twenty Years, 20 NW. 
J. INTL L. & BUS. 383, 385, 408 (2000); KEVIN J. O’BRIEN, REFORM WITHOUT 
LIBERALIZATION: CHINA’S NATIONAL PEOPLE’S CONGRESS AND THE POLITICS OF 
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 13, 20 (2008).  
11
 See, e.g., Pitman Potter, The Administrative Litigation Law of the PRC: 
Judicial Review and Bureaucratic Reform, in DOMESTIC LAW REFORMS IN POST-
MAO CHINA (Pitman Potter ed., 1994); Minxin Pei, Citizens v. Mandarins: 
Administrative Litigation in China, 152 CHINA Q. 832 (1997); David Weller, The 
Bureaucratic Heavy Hand in China: Legal Means for Foreign Investors to 
Challenge Agency Action, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1238 (1998); O’Brien & Li, supra 
note 4; Donald Clarke et al., The Role of Law in China’s Economic Development, 
in CHINA’S GREAT ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION 375 (Thomas Rawski & Loren 
Brandt ed., 2008); Ji Li, Suing the Leviathan – An Empirical Analysis of the 
Changing Rate of Administrative Litigation in China, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 815; Margaret Y.K. Woo, Law and Discretion in Contemporary Chinese 
Courts, in THE LIMITS OF THE RULE OF LAW IN CHINA 163, 174, 183, 190 (Karen G. 
Turner et al. ed., 2000); Lubman, id., at 392.  
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judiciary.
12
 While Chinese tax litigation has generally attracted little 
attention to date, when instances of such litigation are reported in the 
media, they are also quickly portrayed as responding to oppressive 
government actions (and reflecting Chinese courts’ general inability 
to constrain such actions).
13
 Overall, both popular and academic 
discussions of Chinese administrative litigation display a high degree 
of consensus with respect to two claims. First, both the volume and 
outcome of administrative litigation are chiefly functions of the 
distribution of powers between the Chinese judiciary and the 
executive branch—in short, of judicial independence.14 Second, 
administrative litigation is a good thing in itself, and judicial 
institutions should be reformed to deliver a greater amount of that 
good.   
By examining empirical information relating to Chinese tax 
litigation spanning over two decades, I come to conclusions that 
challenge this consensus. I present four sets of findings, obtained 
from applying different devices of empirical and comparative 
analysis. First, certain instinctive judgments in reaction to seemingly 
 
12
 Xin He & Yang Su, Do the “Haves” Come Out Ahead in Shanghai 
Courts, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 120 (2013); Ji Li, Dare You Sue the Tax 
Collectors? An Empirical Study of Tax-Related Administrative Lawsuits in China, 
23 PAC. RIM L. & POLY J. 57 (2014); He Haibo (何海波), Kundun de Xingzheng 
Susong (困顿的行政诉讼) [The wearied state of administrative litigation], 2012 
HUADONG ZHENGFA DAXUE XUEBAO (华东政法大学学报) [JOURNAL OF THE 
EAST CHINA UNIVERSITY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND LAW] no. 2. 
13
 See James Fallows, More on the Detained Chinese Lawyer, THE ATLANTIC 
(Aug. 1, 2009), available at 
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2009/08/more-on-the-detained-
chinese-lawyer/22546; Evan Osnos, Where is Xu Zhiyong? THE NEW YORKER (Jul. 
31, 2009), available at http://www.newyorker.com/news/evan-osnos/where-is-xu-
zhiyong; Ben Blanchard & Yoko Nishikawa, China demands Ai Weiwei pay $1.85 
million in taxes, fines, REUTERS (Jun. 28, 2011, 8:29 AM), available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/28/us-china-artist-
idUSTRE75L3U520110628; Andrew Jacobs, Chinese Artist Is Barred From His 
Own Hearing, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Jun. 20, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/21/world/asia/supporters-take-up-chinese-artist-
ai-weiwei-s-cause-at-court.html?_r=3&ref=world; Sui-Lee Wee, Chinese Court 
Upholds Fine Against Dissident Ai Weiwei, REUTERS (Sep. 27, 2012, 10:21 AM), 
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/27/us-china-dissident-
idUSBRE88P0J720120927.  
14
 Ginsburg, supra note 4, at 24 (“the administrative litigation scheme can 
become an effective arena of political contestation. However, the regime may also 
seek to tighten control over the courts to inhibit them from becoming a major locus 
of social and political change.”) 
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low case volume and plaintiff win rates in Chinese tax litigation are 
hard to justify, in light of available cross-country comparative 
information.
15
 Second, I situate Chinese tax litigation in the context 
of a multi-year, multi-agency study of what disputes against the 
government are brought to Chinese courts and result in judicial 
decisions.
16
 Cross-agency comparisons furnish credible evidence that 
Chinese plaintiffs tend to encounter particularly adverse outcomes in 
litigating against tax agencies; but this may be the result of both 
information asymmetry between plaintiffs and defendants and 
adverse legal standards based on statutes, and need not indicate 
judicial bias favoring tax agency defendants. Third, I assembled the 
largest set of published Chinese judicial decisions in tax cases to 
date,
17
  and systematically analyzed the content of the decisions.
18
 I 
argue, based on such a comprehensive review, that the available 
evidence is consistent with the view that the Chinese judiciary is 
(and has been for some time) able to adjudicate tax disputes with 
competence and reasonable neutrality.
 19
 Fourth and finally, a 
 
15
 This argument is informed by comparative tax dispute resolution 
information generated by both scholarly studies and a variety of professional 
sources. For scholarly studies in the U.S., see, e.g. Leandra Lederman, Which 
Cases Go to Trial?: An Empirical Study of Predictors of Failure to Settle, 49 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 315 (1999); Leandra Lederman & Warren B. Hrung, Do Attorneys 
Do Their Clients Justice? An Empirical Study of Lawyers’ Effects on Tax Court 
Litigation Outcomes, 41 WAKE FOREST LAW REV. 1235 (2006); in Canada, see 
Benjamin Alarie & Andrew Green, Policy Preferences and Expertise in Canadian 
Tax Adjudication, 62 CANADIAN TAX J. 985 (2014); in Japan, see J. Mark 
Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Why the Japanese Taxpayer Always Loses, 72 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 571 (1999); in Israel, David Gliksberg, Does the Law Matter? Win 
Rates and Law Reforms, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 378 (2014). Additional 
scholarly and professional sources are cited in Part I infra.  
16
 The details of the study are set out in Wei Cui & Zhiyuan Wang, The 
Selection of Disputes against Government Agencies: Evidence from a Civil Law 
System (paper presented at the 2015 Annual Meeting of the Italian Law and 
Economics Association; on file with the author).  
17
 The case sample size is, to my knowledge, the largest among existing 
studies in English that analyze Chinese administrative litigation decisions, whether 
generally or within specific regulatory areas. 
18
 Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial 
Opinions, 96 CAL. L. REV. 63 (2008). All decisions in the sample were coded 
intensively, using a score sheet of over 30 questions. The content analysis 
performed captures a large number of features of the decisions, providing a rich set 
of information about the substantive and procedural aspects of the cases. 
19
 The details of this study are fully reported in Cui Wei (崔威), Zhongguo 
Shuiwu Xingzheng Susong Shizheng Yanjiu (中国税务行政诉讼实证研究) [An 
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separate study of Chinese tax administration, which forms the 
essential background of dispute resolution on tax matters, was 
carried out.
20
 That study suggests that the low level of tax litigation 
in China can well be explained by the organization of Chinese tax 
administration, which permits a high frequency of informal 
interactions among taxpayers and tax collectors. This explanation 
implies, however, that the volume of litigation may remain low 
regardless of improvements in the Chinese judiciary.  
Collectively, these findings imply that inferences about the 
power of the judiciary vis-à-vis the executive branch on the basis of 
litigation volume and judicial outcomes are highly unreliable, 
because these observable patterns are determined primarily by other 
factors. This conclusion would not itself be very remarkable if 
reached in the context of a developed legal system. In the U.S., for 
example, the dominant approach to analyzing civil litigation patterns 
is to assume that they are driven by litigants’ rational choice.21 
However, scholars have succumbed to the temptation to depart from 
this approach when engaging with the legal system in authoritarian 
countries. I argue that portraying administrative litigation as a self-
standing institution imbued with a distinct purpose (i.e. offering 
opportunities for plaintiffs and courts to constrain otherwise 
unconstrained government)
22
 has limited benefits, particularly given 
its risk of generating spurious explanations.  
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides background 
information regarding patterns of Chinese tax litigation and discusses 
how these patterns are inadequately explained by prevailing views of 
Chinese administrative litigation. Part II first considers the 
procedural features of Chinese tax litigation that may explain some 
of the litigation patterns. It then presents evidence of a correlation 
between the settlement rate during litigation and plaintiff win rate, 
 
Empirical Study of Tax Litigation in China], 2015 QINGHUA FAXUE (清华法学) 
[TSINGHUA UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL] no.3, 135. 
20
 For a preliminary exposition, see Wei Cui, Administrative 
Decentralization and Tax Compliance: A Transactional Cost Perspective, 65 U. 
TORONTO L.J. 186 (2015).  
21
 See especially the sources cited in note 9 supra. See also STEVEN 
SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW PART IV (2004); 
Kathleen Spier, Litigation, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 259 (A. 
Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell ed., 2007).  
22
 See Ginsburg supra note 4, at 24 (“administrative litigation…will tend to 
constrain the government, even if…regime opponents are [often] not successful in 
their particular lawsuits.”) 
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which suggests that the “trial selection theory” of disputes widely 
applied in studying litigation outcomes in the U.S. may also apply to 
China. According to this theory, non-independent (or incompetent) 
courts are only one among several equally plausible explanations of 
plaintiffs’ poor odds in tax litigation. Part III then investigates the 
strength of evidence for attributing taxpayer’s poor chances to an 
underperforming judiciary. I describe select findings based on the 
extensive content analysis of case law, and argue that neither 
qualitative nor quantitative evidence supports the hypothesis of 
judicial non-independence. Statutory biases and information 
asymmetries between litigants are at least equally good explanations 
of low plaintiff win rates. Part IV then explains how the main cause 
of low tax litigation volume may lie in the structure of Chinese tax 
administration. Part V reviews the implications of these findings for 
the discourse associating administrative litigation with the promotion 
of the rule of law. A brief Conclusion follows. 
I. BASIC FACTS: CASE VOLUME, PLAINTIFF WIN RATE, AND RATE OF 
ADJUDICATION IN CHINESE TAX LITIGATION 
 
 Interest in tax litigation has grown among Chinese tax and legal 
professionals in the last few years.
23
 As a result of Chinese courts’ 
recent extraordinary practice of publishing all decisions that are not 
politically sensitive,
24
 a massive amount of case law of all varieties 
has come to the public light in the last few years, and tax litigation is 
no exception. Chinese tax practitioners are discussing case law much 
more so than they ever did previously, and tax advisors are beginning 
to advise clients to consider the litigation option where they have not 
before.
25
 
 
23
 The first administrative law case that China’s Supreme People’s Court 
(SPC) has tried after a much-anticipated revision of the Administrative Litigation 
Law in 2014 was a lawsuit against the local tax bureau. Luo Shuzhen (罗书臻), 
Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Gongkai Kaiting Shenli Xin Xiugai Xingzheng Susong Fa 
Shishi Hou Diyi Qi Xingzheng Anjian (最高人民法院公开开庭审理新修改行政
诉讼法实施后第一起行政案件 ) [The first Administrative Litigation Case tried in 
a public hearing at the Supreme People’s Court after the implementation of the 
newly amended Administrative Litigation Law], RENMIN FAYUAN BAO (人民法院
报) [PEOPLE'S COURT DAILY], Jun. 30, 2015, at 1. 
24
 See notes 76-82 infra and accompanying text.  
25
 For the prior reluctance of foreign investors to challenge the actions of 
Chinese tax agencies, see Wei Cui, Foreign Administrative Law and International 
Short Title  
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However, lest one hastens to the conclusion that this growing 
interest is attributable to a rising wave of tax litigation, some 
sobering statistics should be considered. According to data published 
by China’s Supreme People’s Court (SPC),26 the quantity of first-
instance tax litigation in China experienced a significant decline 
since the late 1990s: close to 2000 cases a year were brought at the 
beginning of this period; the number declined to around 1000 a year 
by 2004, and to around 300 by 2007; they have stayed around 400 a 
year more recently (see Chart 1). SPC data indicates that the ratio of 
tax litigation to the total volume of (first instance) administrative 
litigation in China also declined from 2.4% in 2000 to 0.3% in 2013. 
While tax disputes became rarer during this period, administrative 
litigation as a whole grew. 
 
 
 
Thus in both absolute and relative terms, the volume of Chinese 
tax litigation may seem low in some intuitive ways. The absolute 
number of cases a year (around 400) seems low relative to China’s 
population and the size of its economy. The U.S. Tax Court alone 
sees around 30,000 cases docketed a year.
27
 India, a country with 
 
Taxation: a Case Study of Tax Treaty Implementation in China, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 
191 (2012). 
26
 For a discussion of the nature of the SPC data, see Cui and Wang, supra 
note 16.  Since the late 1980s the data has appeared in the annual China Law 
Yearbook (中国法律年鉴). Unless otherwise indicated, all data regarding the 
quantity of administrative litigation and manners in which such cases are disposed 
provided in this Article comes from this source. 
27
 HAROLD DUBROFF & BRENT J. HELLWIG, THE UNITED STATES TAX 
COURT: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS (2014). Unlike the U.S. and a small number of 
other countries, China has no specialized tax courts. (Given the small quantity of 
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
Chart 1: Quantity of Tax Litigation in China, 1998-2013 
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comparable population size to China, also sees over 20,000 first 
instance tax cases a year.
28
 China’s tax litigation volume is more 
comparable to Japan’s, which legal scholars have treated as a low-
litigation jurisdiction.
29
  
However, these crude comparative figures need to be viewed 
with caution: since comparative tax litigation data is not generally 
available, it is difficult to know which countries constitute the norm 
and which countries the outliers. Even the U.S.’ and India’s tax 
litigation volumes are dwarfed by the number of tax cases in Italy
30
 
and Brazil.
31
 Thus perhaps a more persuasive assessment would refer 
to the fact that the Chinese tax bureaucracy employs more than 10% 
of China’s civil servants, and tax administration clearly touches on 
the everyday operation of every Chinese business.
32
 Given the size of 
the tax branch of the Chinese administrative state, even the 2.4% of 
tax cases in 2000 relative to the total volume of litigation against the 
government seems disproportionately low, not to mention the 0.3% 
found in recent years.
33
 
 
tax litigation each year, creating such a court would be hard to justify.) Tax cases, 
along with other types of administrative litigation, are tried by administrative law 
tribunals that can be found in most courts at various levels across the country. 
28
 PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, NAVIGATING TAX CONTROVERSY IN INDIA 
15 (2005). 
29
 Ramseyer & Rasmusen, supra note 15, reports that there were 189 and 154 
cases of tax litigation (including appeals) in Japan in 1989 and 1994, respectively.  
See also Akihiro Hironaka, et al., Japan, in TAX DISPUTES AND LITIGATION 
REVIEW 162, 164 (2d ed., Simon Whitehead ed., 2014) (294 tax lawsuits were 
reported in 2013 in Japan). It is worth noting, however, that in recent years the 
Canadian Tax Court has received on average only 600 cases a year, even though 
Canada does not have a reputation for being a “low litigation” jurisdiction. Alarie 
& Green, supra note 15, at 996. 
30
 247,911 tax cases decided by and 510,236 tax cases pending at the Court 
of First Instance in 2013, See Roma Giugno, Appendici Statistiche E Guida Alla 
Relazione Sul monitoraggio Dello Stato Del Contenzioso Tributario e Sull’ 
Attivita’ Delle Commissioni Tributarie 45 (2014), available at 
http://www.piscino.it/file/bilancio/ctr-06-1.pdf.  
31
 See Lourdes Garcia-Navarro & Paula Moura, Brazil: The Land of Many 
Lawyers And Very Slow Justice, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (Nov. 05, 2014, 2:15 
PM), available at 
http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2014/11/05/359830235/brazil-the-land-of-
many-lawyers-and-very-slow-justice (1,660,000 cases in progress in the court that 
deals with tax avoidance in the city of Sao Paulo alone).  
32
 Cui, supra note 20, at 225. 
33
 Figures given by Ramseyer & Rasmusen, supra note 15, suggest that tax 
litigation comprises between 20% and one third of all civil lawsuits against the 
government in Japan. 
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Equally striking, of course, is the decline in tax litigation in the 
last 10 years. There are different hypotheses that would explain this 
decline, none of which can at the present be confirmed. One is that 
Chinese tax administration practice has possibly improved in terms 
of greater conformity to rule of law norms.
34
 Changing 
administration practices may also be relevant. It has been reported 
that tax agencies have in recent years adopted more “collaborative” 
forms of tax collection and applied penalties less frequently.
35
 Tax 
disputes may be predicted to decrease as a result.
36
 Another 
hypothesis for explaining the decline of tax litigation, with a 
different thrust, is that the revision in 2000 of the Law on the 
Administration of Tax Collection,
37
 the general procedural statute for 
tax administration, significantly expanded the powers of tax agencies, 
legitimized certain agency practices that had previously been 
controversial, and otherwise made it more difficult for lawsuits 
against tax agencies to be brought.
38
 Yet another hypothesis is that it 
was the high volume of tax litigation in the late 1990s that was 
abnormal, attributable possibly to the rapid changes in the 
organization of tax administration in China during that time.
39
 The 
 
34
 The Chinese police also saw a substantial decline in both the absolute and 
relative quantities of lawsuits brought against it (a drop of 1/3 and over 80%, 
respectively) in the same period,
 
and some Chinese scholars have been willing to 
attribute this to improved policing practice. He, supra note 12, at 88.  
35
 Whether an agency adopts a collaborative or adversarial approach to 
regulation arguably has no direct implications for the assessment of the agency 
under rule of law norms. For a discussion of Chinese tax agencies’ experiments in 
recent years with more collaborative approaches to tax collection, see Qian Junwen 
(钱俊文) & Wei Guoqing (韦国庆), Nashui Pinggu de Hefa Xing Zhengyi Jiqi 
Jiejue (纳税评估的合法性争议及其解决) [The controversy of legal status of tax 
assessment and its solution], 2013 SHUIWU YANJIU (税务研究 )  [TAXATION 
RESEARCH] no. 1, 72.  For analysis of the adoption of such collaborative forms in 
other Chinese regulatory agencies, see, e.g. Carlos Wing-Hung Lo et al., Changes 
in Regulatory Enforcement Styles among Environmental Enforcement Officials in 
China, 41 ENVIRON. PLAN. A 2706 (2009). 
36
 Note that accepting this explanation can affect one’s view of what level of 
litigation is “too low:” one should be less inclined to view the current level of tax 
litigation as abnormally low, if its decline from a previously more “normal-
looking” level has a ready explanation. 
37
 Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Shuishou Zhengshou Guanli Fa (中华人
民共和国税收征收管理法 ) [Law on the Administration of Tax Collection] 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Sep. 4, 1992, effective 
as amended May 1, 2001) [hereinafter referred to as “LATC”]. 
38
 See notes 134-136 infra.  
39
 See Cui, supra note 20, at 201.  
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steady, lower level of tax litigation in recent years merely represents 
a reversion to the mean. Because of the lack of information about 
Chinese tax litigation in the 1990s,
40
 it is difficult to confirm or 
disconfirm any of these hypotheses. Note, though, none of these 
hypotheses refers to the quality of Chinese courts at all. 
Fluctuations in litigation levels are unique neither to tax agencies 
nor to China. In countries enjoying high levels of rule of law, both 
the level at any given time and fluctuations over time in 
administrative litigation volumes simply remain esoteric facts: they 
are rarely noticed and even more rarely highlighted as demanding 
explanation.
41
 However, when administrative litigation is held to 
symbolize mechanisms of constraining authoritarian power, its 
volume becomes imbued with significance. Moreover, instead of 
offering hypotheses like the ones just described, scholars of Chinese 
law who find the level of administrative litigation lower than they 
expect often take such low case volume to impugn the court 
system.
42
  Such commentary displays two implicit assumptions: first, 
the actions or inactions of courts are the primary determinants of 
observed litigation patterns; second, since administrative litigation is 
a good thing, a lower-than-expected level of such litigation indicates 
under-performance or even malfunction of the courts.
43
 Yet at least 
in the tax context, these assumptions fit uncomfortably with the data. 
If they were held onto, declining litigation volume would imply that 
Chinese judiciary became less independent vis-à-vis tax agencies 
over time, and/or that tax agencies became more powerful relative to 
 
40
 See note 88 infra.  
41
 In U.S. tax scholarship, I am aware of only instance of such attention. See 
Yehonatan Givati, Resolving Legal Uncertainty: The Unfulfilled Promise of 
Advance Tax Rulings, 29 VA. L. REV.  137, 146 (2009) (noting a greater than 50% 
drop of tax cases filed in the U.S. between 1996 and 2000 and complete recovery 
in the years afterwards, and stating that such fluctuation “calls for further 
research”). 
42
 See, e.g. He, supra note 12, at 88 (suggesting that the low level of tax 
litigation also signals a failure of the public remedy system); Rachel E. Stern, The 
Political Logic of China's New Environmental Courts, 72 CHINA J. 53 (2014) 
(noting an inadequate quantity of environmental litigation and suggesting that 
courts must do more to increase such quantity). A recent study argued that the level 
of tax litigation confirms a “shared understanding [among commentators on 
Chinese law] that local courts do not normally adjudicate administrative lawsuits 
against government agencies impartially and judicial bias is presumably more 
serious when powerful agencies, such as tax bureaus, are sued.” Li, supra note 12 
at 58 (footnotes omitted). 
43
 Li, supra note 11, at 840.  
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other agencies over time. But there is no independent reason to 
embrace or even consider such claims.  
Another implicit assumption of previous commentary on 
Chinese administrative litigation is that plaintiff win rates serve as a 
specific mechanism through which the actions of Chinese courts may 
affect litigation volume. More specifically, plaintiff win rates reflect 
judicial attitudes, and low plaintiff win rates, reflecting judicial bias 
in favor of government defendants, could deter litigation.
44
  What do 
we know about plaintiff win rates in tax litigation? The SPC also 
offers information about the ways in which tax cases are disposed, 
which can be classified into plaintiff wins and losses. Using this 
information, I calculate two rates, the “plaintiff win rate” and the 
“adjudication rate”, for each year. Chart 2 maps the evolution of both 
the plaintiff win rate and the adjudication rate for tax litigation over 
the course of 16 years. It can be seen that the adjudication rate has 
largely followed an inverse-U-shaped development (with a blip in 
2005-6), going from a low of 24.4% in 1998 to a high of 67.5% in 
2004 and back to 32.1% in 2010. Plaintiff win rates went from a high 
point of 26% in 1998 down to 9.5% in 2001 and back to 16.7% in 
2012. Thus in the late 1990s, when more lawsuits were brought 
against tax agencies, both the rate of withdrawal of lawsuits and the 
rate of plaintiff wins were also higher.  
 
 
 
Are Chinese taxpayer plaintiffs’ odds of winning too low, and 
could this be why few lawsuits are brought? Cross-country 
comparative information again offers no support for these 
assessments.  Plaintiff win rates in U.S. tax and district courts have 
 
44
 He & Su, supra note 12, at 139; Li, supra note 12.  
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Chart 2: Adjudication and plaintiff win rates in tax 
litigation, 1998-2013 
Adjudicatio…
Plaintiff…
Does Judicial Independence Matter?  
14   
been reported to range from 15%
45
 to 29%,
46
 which are not much 
higher than China’s.47 While higher plaintiff win rates have been 
reported for other countries, those countries do not always have 
higher (per capita) litigation volumes.
48
 Although such comparative 
information is quite limited, it still warns us that, with no further 
theory, we should have little confidence that judicial biases and 
judicial capacity offer even relevant explanations of case volume and 
observed litigation outcome, let alone the most important ones.  
The next Part will examine a number of features of Chinese 
dispute resolution institutions that are clearly relevant to 
understanding case volume and litigation outcome. Each of these 
features is shared by Chinese institutions with those of many other 
countries, although some combination of features may be more 
unique. One such feature is the availability of administrative 
remedies: in China as in many other countries, the appeal of the 
action of a government agency within the executive branch before a 
dispute is brought to courts is either a requirement or a right that is 
commonly exercised. This may systematically reduce litigation 
volume, and also indirectly affect observed plaintiff win rates. 
Similarly, any cost to the pursuit of formal dispute resolution—such 
as the requirement Chinese taxpayers face to pay the disputed tax 
liability before bringing even an appeal within the executive 
branch—could also suppress litigation volume and affect that 
outcome of cases that are brought to courts. More generally, the costs 
of dispute resolution may lead to settlements at different points after 
a dispute arises, conditional upon the litigants’ respective 
 
45
 Daniel M. Schneider, Using the Social Background Model to Explain Who 
Wins Federal Appellate Tax Decisions: Do Less Traditional Judges Favor the 
Taxpayer? 25 VA. TAX REV. 201, 224 (2005) (calculation based on 1292 randomly 
sampled tax cases in the Federal circuit courts between 1996 and 2000). 
46
 Daniel M. Schneider, Assessing and Predicting Who Wins Federal Tax 
Trial Decisions, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV.  473, 519 (2002) (a study of 482 
randomly sampled cases for the Tax Court and from District Courts during the 
1979-1998 period).  
47
 One professional article reports that taxpayers in Germany also win only 
20% of the first instance cases. See Michael Hendricks, Germany, in TAX 
DISPUTES AND LITIGATION REVIEW 101, 102 (2d ed., Simon Whitehead ed., 2014).  
48
 Alarie & Green, for example, report a close-to-50% taxpayer win rate in 
the Canadian Tax Court, but the volume of tax litigation is low in Canada 
compared to the U.S. and to other countries with lower reported win rates (e.g. 
Italy). See notes 15 and 30, supra, for litigation volume in Canada and Italy. Italy’s 
taxpayer’s win rate was between 30% and 40% in 2013. See ROMA GIUGNO, supra 
note 30.   
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expectations and degrees of uncertainty. Litigants’ rational choices in 
light of these costs and subject to these information constraints could 
easily reduce or eliminate the effect of judicial bias (or capacity) on 
observed litigation outcome.
49
 It is only by taking these institutional 
factors into account —as urged by some of the most influential 
contemporary theories about legal systems—that one can begin to 
make inferences from litigation patterns. 
II. INSTITUTIONAL DETERMINANTS: EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
REMEDIES AND SETTLEMENTS DURING LITIGATION 
A. Settlement Prior to and as a Result of Administrative Appeal 
 
The option to pursue administrative appeals prior to litigation is 
an important feature distinguishing administrative litigation from 
other types of civil litigation. It implies the existence of an 
institutionalized procedure for resolving disputes between private 
parties and the government, before the disputes reach courts. Just as 
settlements during litigation reduce the number of cases tried by 
judges, appeals within the executive branch reduce the number of 
cases docketed with courts in the first place. While negotiations prior 
to potential plaintiffs’ decisions to bring suit also lead to settlements 
and reduce the number of cases docketed in other types of civil 
disputes, administrative appeal, as a public institution, often requires 
the government to record the quantity of disputes between it and 
private parties and the manners in which they are resolved pre-
litigation. This type of pre-litigation settlement, therefore, may be 
more observable than in other areas. 
In China, the administrative remedy that is available to citizens 
as an alternative to, or an option prior to, seeking judicial remedies is 
called administrative reconsideration (AR).
50
 For tax disputes, AR 
possesses special significance, because in all disputes regarding the 
 
49
 Law and economic analysis of the outcomes of civil litigation in the 
United States generally demonstrate—or assume—the elimination of such effects 
of judicial biases. See Hylton & Lin, supra note 9; SHAVELL, supra note 21.  
50
 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Fuyi Fa (中华人民共和国行政
复议法) [Administrative Reconsideration Law] (promulgated by the Nat'l People's 
Cong., Apr. 29, 1999, effective Oct. 1, 1999) (Lawinfochina) (China); see also 
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Fuyi Fa Shishi Tiaoli (中华人民共和国
行政复议法实施条例) [Regulation on the Implementation of the Administrative 
Reconsideration Law] (promulgated by the St. Council, May 29, 2007, effective 
Aug. 1, 2007) (Lawinfochina) (China). 
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assessments of deficient tax payments, AR is a remedy that must be 
exhausted before judicial review is available.
51
 But not all disputes 
with tax agencies go through AR first. For disputes regarding the 
imposition of a civil penalty, an enforcement action or a seizure to 
secure tax payment, the taxpayer may choose either to apply for AR 
or directly to bring a complaint to court. Actually litigated cases thus 
involve a mixture of disputes that have gone through the AR process 
and those that have not. Previous studies based on limited case 
samples suggest that tax cases litigated that are preceded by AR 
represent over 35% of all tax lawsuits.
52
 This is higher than the 
proportion of litigation preceded by AR in the overall population of 
administrative litigation, which has been estimated to be around 
20%.
53
 The difference reflects the fact that, unlike the United States, 
where the exhaustion of administrative remedies is a general 
administrative law doctrine broadly applicable across most 
agencies,
54
 the requirement is imposed in China only on less than a 
handful of agencies and subject areas other than tax agencies and the 
assessment of tax deficiencies. 
Could this fact be relevant to understanding why the volume of 
tax litigation is distinctly low relative to total administrative 
litigation? Suppose two agencies, A and B, face the same amount of 
potential disputes, but disputes against A can go to court directly 
while disputes against B must go through AR first. If AR is able to 
resolve many disputes, the number of lawsuits against B should be 
much lower than the number of lawsuits against A.  
Unfortunately, this factor explains fairly little. In a previous 
study, I calculate that among tax disputes that are brought to AR, 
around 14% go on to be litigated.
55
 This implies that only about 
 
51
 LATC, supra note 37, art. 88. Shuiwu Xingzheng Fuyi Guize (税务行政
复议规则) [Rules for Tax Administration Reconsideration] (promulgated by the 
St. Admin. of Tax'n, Feb. 10, 2010, effective Apr. 1, 2010) (Lawinfochina) (China) 
(defining procedures of administrative appeals against all tax agencies). 
52
 See Cui, supra note 19, at 141; Huang Qihui (黄启辉), Xingzheng Susong 
Yishen Shenpan Zhuangkuang Yanjiu (行政诉讼一审审判状况研究) [A Study of 
First Instance Adjudication of Administrative Lawsuits], 4 QINGHUA FAXUE (清华
法学) [TSINGHUA UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL] 73 (2013), at 80.  
53
 See Xin He, Administrative Reconsideration’s Erosion of Administrative 
Litigation in China, 2 CHINA J COMP LAW 1, 10 (2014). 
54
 See generally, 2 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATIES 
(5TH ED., 2015) (Chapter 15 Exhaustion, Finality, and Ripeness). 
55
 This computation is based on knowledge of the ratio of the total number of 
ARs brought against tax agencies to the total number of lawsuits brought against 
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1,000 AR procedures a year are pursued by Chinese taxpayers,
56
 
which seems a miniscule number in light of the sheer size of Chinese 
tax administration and the prominence taxation holds for most 
businesses. To understand low case load in courts, therefore, one 
must understand why taxpayers do not tend to seek administrative 
review of tax agencies’ assessments of deficiencies to begin with. 
For those who are inclined to explain litigation outcomes in 
terms of features of judicial institutions, one explanation may come 
to mind. Perhaps Chinese taxpayers believe that anyone in the 
executive branch reviewing a tax agency action during an AR 
proceeding is likely to be biased in favor of the government.
57
  If 
they also believe that courts tend to rule in favor of tax agencies, then 
they may not initiate any AR proceeding at all: the pursuit of dispute 
resolution would be futile.  Therefore, (perceived) judicial bias could 
indirectly reduce the volume of AR (and, mechanically, the volume 
of tax litigation). However, this explanation implies that those who 
do end up initiating AR proceedings should be prepared to litigate, 
since the complainant is unlikely to acquire new information about 
the biases of courts in the AR proceeding itself. But this is not the 
case. While an estimated 14% of tax AR cases continue to litigation, 
a far higher proportion of complainants receive unfavorable 
determinations at the end of AR proceedings.
58
 Such a high rate of 
 
the same tax agencies; the information is available only for a part of China’s tax 
bureaucracy and only for a few years. The estimate is consistent with the result of a 
government study in 2007. See Cui, supra note 19. Note that this percentage itself 
is not too different from the U.S. Lederman, supra note 15, at 329, note 62, reports 
that IRS “settles approximately 90% of the cases it considers”. 
56
 Currently no reliable statistic is independently available concerning the 
total number of AR proceedings against tax agencies. The number must therefore 
be inferred. If one assumes that 35% of litigated tax cases have gone through AR, 
and that these represent just 14% of all tax AR proceedings, then at 400 litigated 
cases a year, there are about 1,000 AR tax procedures. 
57
 Such a belief would be well-justified, given that the rate of affirmation of 
agency actions during AR proceedings in general has consistently been greater 
than 50% He, supra note 53, at 8. No information is currently available regarding 
the breakdown of types of dispositions for tax AR proceedings specifically.  
58
 A 2007 government report claimed that complainants in tax AR 
proceedings were able to obtain a favorable ruling or a settlement 62% of the 
time—which would be markedly higher than the outcome for AR proceedings in 
general. See Lin Hong (蔺红), Guojia Shuiwu Zongju Fahui Fuyi Zhineng Cujin 
Zhengce Wanshan (国家税务总局发挥复议职能促进政策完善 ) [The State 
Administration of Taxation Used Administrative Reconsideration to Improve Tax 
Policymaking], ZHONGGUO SHUIWU BAO (中国税务报) [CHINA TAXATION NEWS], 
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attrition at the end of AR proceedings would be inexplicable if 
complainants made decisions to pursue AR after already having 
taken into account possible judicial bias.  
What else, then, might explain the low volume of tax AR 
proceedings? Notably, when a taxpayer is required to apply for AR 
before bringing a lawsuit (e.g. in all disputes regarding deficiency 
assessments), it must also first remit the tax amount as determined by 
the tax authority, or provide corresponding guaranty, as a condition 
for opening an AR proceeding.
59
 Such a requirement is not totally 
exceptional in comparative perspective,
60
 but it does seem to erect a 
barrier to the pursuit of a dispute. It could do so in two ways. First, if 
the tax paid is later ruled to be over-assessed, but no interest is paid 
on the over-collected amount, the payoff to litigation is reduced, 
since the tax refunded in the future is worth less now given the 
foregone interest. This may induce settlement.
61
 However, such an 
effect is significant only if the expected duration of litigation is long, 
the rate of foregone interest is high, or the amount in dispute is very 
large.
62
 Second and more significantly, it is possible that the 
defendant’s negotiation position generally changes after an AR is 
brought: the government is easier to negotiate with before a formal 
dispute is instigated, but toughens its position once a dispute is 
 
Feb. 5, 2007, at 2. Yet even this high number implies 38% of complainants 
receiving unfavorable rulings. 
59
 LATC, supra note 37, art. 88. In disputes where AR is not a precondition 
for seeking judicial remedies, such prior payment (e.g., of the penalty) also is not 
required. Id. 
60
 The OECD reports a large number of countries authorizing the collection 
of disputed tax during both AR and judicial review, although tax agencies in some 
country may refrain from exercising such authority while a dispute is pending. 
OECD, TAX ADMINISTRATION 2013: COMPARATIVE INFORMATION ON OECD AND 
OTHER ADVANCED AND EMERGING ECONOMIES 324-325, 345-347 (2013). Some 
countries (including Japan and the UK) explicitly impose a requirement to pay 
assessed deficiencies before disputing an assessment in court. Id. Other countries 
require the provision of a guaranty for the tax amount disputed. See Aurora Ribes, 
Spain, in COURTS AND TAX TREATY LAW 333, 336 (Guglielmo Maisto ed., 2007). 
61
 Under current Chinese law, there is no clear provision requiring the 
government to compensate for interest on tax refunded after AR or litigation.  
62
 My review of the sample of published tax cases discussed in Part III 
indicates that the average duration for a dispute to be decided by a first instance 
court is less than two years. While the opportunity cost of funds for average 
taxpayers or the cost of financing (for cash constrained taxpayers) is a more 
complex matter, it should be noted that the interest cost of owing tax is also high: 
Chinese tax law provides for an interest rate  of over 18% per annum) for overdue 
tax amounts. LATC, supra note 37, art. 32.   
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governed by formal legal procedures.
63
 This may happen, for 
example, if the government’s negotiating position after entering into 
a formal dispute is based closely on law and estimates of the 
likelihood of prevailing during AR and litigation, whereas before 
entering a formal dispute, it is influenced more by ongoing 
interactions with the taxpayer and considerations of revenue targets, 
or is more open to the discretion of particular revenue agents.  
This second possibility, however, implies that even if there is no 
requirement to pay tax before bringing an AR complaint against a tax 
agency, taxpayers may prefer to reach settlements instead of going 
into AR. In other words, the incremental cost of paying tax first 
before pursuing formal dispute resolution may not exert a significant 
independent effect. In any case, existing AR statistics does not offer 
evidence that the requirement to pay tax as a precondition for AR 
induces more pre-AR settlement.
64
 If there is greater pre-AR 
settlement in tax, it should follow that the rate of settlement during a 
tax AR proceeding should be lower than AR proceedings in general: 
the tax cases that can be settled are more likely to have already been 
settled. However, this appears not to be the case. Previous authors 
suggest that between 16% and 18% of all AR cases continue to 
litigation.
65
 These percentages are actually higher, or at least not very 
different from, the estimated figure of 14% for tax AR cases that 
 
63
 One can imagine the tax agency’s position toughening once an AR 
proceeding opens, and toughening even further once a lawsuit is launched. 
64
 In the U.S., Tax Court cases represent 95% of all first-instance tax cases 
brought to federal courts. This has been explained by reference to the fact that for a 
dispute with an IRS tax assessment to be accepted by the Federal Court of Claims 
or a District Court, the tax assessed has first to be paid (thus these latter courts only 
accept lawsuits for refunds of tax paid). Leandra Lederman, What Do Courts Have 
To Do With It? The Judiciary’s Role in Making Federal Tax Law, 65 NATL. TAX J. 
899 (2012). However, there the observed effect of the requirement to pay tax 
before bringing a dispute is on the choice between alternative venues, not on 
whether to bring a dispute at all. Moreover, other aspects of Tax Court practice, 
such as the availability of informal procedures, the commonality of pro se cases, 
may all make the U.S. Tax Court a more attractive choice to most taxpayers. See 
generally, Id.  Lederman also mentions the fact that IRS notices of deficiency only 
inform taxpayers of the option to challenge the notice in the Tax Court, and not of 
other choices. Id. 
65
 He, supra note 53, at 9, 12 (providing an estimate of 19% for 2009, and 
citing an earlier study that estimate an average of 16-17%). These percentages still 
reflect a relatively high rate of attrition from dispute resolution, even after 
receiving unfavorable AR determinations. Id, at n7. 
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continue to litigation. Taxpayer complainants drop out of dispute 
resolution no less frequently than other complainants.
66
 
In summary, while pre-litigation procedures for tax disputes are 
distinctive relative to other areas of disputes with Chinese 
government agencies, they do not seem to explain the low volume of 
tax litigation. Moreover, the limited information available regarding 
taxpayers’ use of these procedures seems to reject the relevance of 
judicial quality: the quality of the Chinese judiciary appears unlikely 
to be a primary or even significant factor explaining observed low 
case volume.
67
  
B. Settlement during Litigation 
 
One might expect judicial quality to matter more once disputes 
are brought to courts. However, it turns out that an important 
determinant of plaintiff win rate in Chinese tax litigation is the rate 
of withdrawal from litigation before courts issue their decisions. 
Using the same data as Chart 2, Chart 3 illustrates a negative 
correlation between the rates of adjudication (which is basically the 
complement of the rate of withdrawal) and the plaintiff win rates 
observed over 16 years. This correlation implies that, in any given 
year, the more disputes reached the stages where courts issued 
decisions (i.e. the less often the plaintiffs settled with tax agencies or 
otherwise dropped their lawsuits), the less likely plaintiffs are to win 
in court.
68
 
 
 
66
 Moreover, limited information on settlement before a decision is issued at 
the end of an AR proceeding suggests that this type of settlement does not occur 
less frequently in tax than in other areas. See Cui, supra note 19, at 142, for more 
detailed discussion. 
67
 However, pre-litigation procedures may well have effects on other 
observed litigation patterns. For example, the disputes not resolved during the AR 
process and subsequently brought to courts may settle less frequently during 
litigation than cases that are directly brought to courts. One can expect this 
substitutive effect between earlier and later settlements because the disputes that 
are more amenable to settlement are likely to have been settled earlier. The lower 
settlement rates for lawsuits preceded by AR also implies that disputes preceded by 
AR may be over-represented in published court verdicts relative to its proportion in 
all lawsuits, since only cases that are not settled receive judicial verdicts See note 
108 infra and accompanying text. 
68
 More advanced statistical analysis confirms the significance of the 
correlation observed in Chart 3. See Cui & Wang, supra note 16. 
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This finding is important in several ways. First, it implies that 
the cases that are decided by courts do not form a random and 
representative sample of all disputes that are litigated. If decided 
cases were such a sample, the rate of plaintiff win should remain 
roughly the same regardless of what proportion of disputes is 
adjudicated; but this is clearly not the case. Thus, as low as Chinese 
taxpayers’ chances of winning in court seem from decided cases (see 
Chart 2 supra), their frequency of winning would be even lower if 
more cases were adjudicated. Second, a statistically significant 
correlation between the rates of adjudication and plaintiff wins, when 
observed in the U.S. context, is generally taken by existing 
scholarship to be strong evidence for the “trial selection theory” of 
civil litigation.
69
 According to this theory, rational litigants go to trial 
when the difference in their expected values of the payoff from 
litigation is greater than the aggregate cost of litigation for both 
parties.
70
 When the differences in expected value of litigation are 
smaller than the collective cost of litigation, the parties can achieve a 
mutually beneficial outcome by settling the dispute instead. This 
rational choice model of litigant behavior also predict that, all other 
things equal, plaintiffs are less likely to win where defendants (i) 
have greater stakes in litigation than plaintiffs, and/or (ii) have 
 
69
 See Hylton & Lin, supra note 9, for a recent review of this body of theory, 
which was pioneered by Priest & Klein, supra note 9. 
70
 Differences in expectations arise from different estimations of the 
probability of plaintiff prevailing, due to uncertainty and asymmetrical 
information. 
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significant private information about the matter in dispute.
71
 In other 
words, insofar as the trial selection theory is applicable to a particular 
context,
72
 it tells us that litigation outcomes should be traced as much 
to the choices of litigants as to the behavior of judges. 
Using a sophisticated analytical tool like the trial selection 
theory indeed allows one to make a number of refined judgments 
about Chinese tax litigation patterns. For example, a cross-agency 
comparison shows that the plaintiff win rate in tax disputes tends to 
be lower than the majority of other agencies.
73
 The trial selection 
theory typically explains such patterns by reference to several factors.  
For example, different degrees of information asymmetry among 
litigants may be relevant. Any information advantage of the 
defendant is predicted by the selection theory to generate lower 
plaintiff win rates (holding other things equal). In comparing 
litigation outcomes against different Chinese government agencies, it 
can indeed be seen that in tax and certain other areas of regulation 
(such as policing, public health, environmental protection, and 
family planning), the plaintiff win rates are lower. One explanation, 
consistent with the selection theory, is that these agencies’ primary 
roles are to enforce the law. They may thus be much more familiar 
with the details of the law to be enforced and how the law is 
generally applied than the subjects of enforcement. This amounts to a 
form of information asymmetry between plaintiff and defendants. By 
contrast, a number of other agencies that lose more often as 
defendants (such as land management and urban planning bureaus) 
face plaintiffs that are real estate developers, or who bring class 
action suits. These are precisely types of plaintiffs who suffer less 
from information disadvantages.   
Another relevant factor is differences in statutory standards. It is 
conceivable that the Chinese government has written the law in such 
 
71
 When both the stakes and information are symmetrical between plaintiffs 
and defendants, then as legal uncertainty goes down and the cost of litigation goes 
up, the adjudication rate tends towards zero, and the plaintiff win rate, famously, 
tends to 50%. Priese & Klein, supra note 9.  
72
 The novelty of finding evidence for the trial selection theory in the 
Chinese context lies in the fact that very few legal scholars have so far explored 
whether that theory holds in civil law jurisdictions. For further discussion, see Cui 
& Wang, supra note16. 
73
 Id. Taxpayer plaintiffs seem to fare considerably better when suing certain 
other types of government entities, including township governments, land 
management bureaus, urban planning bureaus, and agricultural bureaus, although 
they tend to fare equally bad or even worse when suing family planning agencies 
and public health bureaus. 
Short Title  
 DOES JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE MATTER? 23 
a way as to give greater power to its most coercive branches, such as 
taxation, family planning, and public security. In this case, holding 
all other things equal, plaintiffs should be less likely to win.  By 
contrast, it seems very unlikely that the distribution of power of the 
judiciary relative to different government departments can explain 
the variation in plaintiff win rates. There is no reason to have even 
thought that family planning agencies are more powerful vis-à-vis 
the judiciary than township governments, or that public health 
officials are more powerful than those managing land use and issuing 
building permits. Other factors, unrelated to judicial quality, must be 
at play.  
As with the discussion of factors that may explain the decline of 
the volume of tax litigation in Part I, establishing the relevance of 
these factors empirically requires good data. In the next Part, I will 
summarize the findings from a unique collection of tax disputes that 
bear on these questions of information asymmetry and legal 
standards. In addition, having noted that judicial quality is unlikely to 
explain variations of plaintiffs’ chances when litigating against 
different agencies, I will also examine whether there is evidence for 
judicial bias in published tax case law. 
III. EVIDENCE FROM A SYSTEMATIC REVIEW OF CASE LAW 
 
Parts I and II analyzed aggregate data on Chinese tax litigation. 
To evaluate the determinants of administrative litigation patterns, 
and specifically to assess how the quality of judicial institutions may 
affect both litigation outcome and whether private parties decide to 
bring suit in the first place, it is of course helpful to study the 
disputes themselves. This Part will discuss some findings from 
analyses of the most comprehensive collection of judicial decisions 
resulting from tax litigation in China.
74
  
A. The Sample 
 
Because China has a civil law system in which most decided 
cases have no precedential value,
75
 for a long time there were no 
institutional mechanisms or rationales for Chinese courts to publish 
their decisions systematically. Consequently, the publication of 
 
74
 For a fuller exposition, see Cui, supra note 19. 
75
 See DANIEL C.K. CHOW, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC 
OF CHINA IN A NUTSHELL (2015).  
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judicial decisions on administrative lawsuits was both highly 
haphazard and highly selective.
76
 However, case publication 
practices of Chinese courts went through a radical transformation in 
recent years. In 2009, China’s Supreme People’s Court urged all 
courts to promote judicial transparency by placing cases online.
77
  
Simultaneously with this announcement (and in some places even 
before), several jurisdictions, including the province of Henan and 
the City of Shanghai, began to release a large amount of judicial 
verdicts on the internet.
78
 At the end of 2013, the SPC launched its 
own website publishing judicial decisions rendered by courts across 
China,
79
 while issuing guidelines regarding what types of decisions 
should be made public.
80
 Since then, an extraordinary amount of 
judicial decisions has become accessible.
 
Although restrictions are 
placed on the publication of several categories of decisions, 
administrative litigation is not one of them.
81
 Existing examinations 
 
76
 Some decisions were published in textbooks for judge training, or 
otherwise as results of one-time efforts by judges, scholars, or others interested in 
administrative litigation to depict judicial practice. The cases that became publicly 
accessible in this manner were probably unrepresentative due to editor bias. 
77
 Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Yingfa Guanyu Sifa Gongkai de Liuxiang Guiding 
he Guanyu Renmin Fayuan Jieshou Xinwen Meiti Yulun Jiandu De Ruogan 
Guiding de Tongzhi (最高人民法院印发《关于司法公开的六项规定》和《关
于人民法院接受新闻媒体舆论监督的若干规定》的通知) [Supreme People’s 
Court’s Notice on the Publication of Six Measures on Judicial Openness and 
Certain Provisions on People’s Court Accepting News Media Supervision] 
(promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Dec. 8, 2009). 
78
 For a discussion of such initiatives in Henan, see Benjamin Liebman, 
Leniency in Chinese Criminal Law? Everyday Justice in Henan 6-13 (Columbia 
Public Law Research Paper No. 14-406/Aug. 7, 2014), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2491889. By early 2014 more than 600,000 cases has 
been posted online in Henan. Id, at 8. For a discussion of similar initiatives in 
Shanghai, see He & Su, supra note 12, at 126. More than 100,000 decisions had 
been made available in Shanghai by 2009. Note that these numbers pertain to all 
varieties of judicial verdicts allowed to be published and not just administrative 
litigation.  
79
 See ZHONGGUO CAIPAN WENSHU WANG (中国裁判文书网) [JUDICIAL 
OPINIONS OF CHINA], available at http://www.court.gov.cn/zgcpwsw/.  
80
 Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Renmin Fayuan Zai Hulianwang Gongbu 
Caipan Wenshu de Guiding (最高人民法院关于人民法院在互联网公布裁判文
书的规定 ) [Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on the Issuance of 
Judgments on the Internet by the People’s Courts], ZHONGGUO FAYUAN WANG (中
国法院网) [CHINA COURT WEB] (Nov. 12, 2013). 
81
 See Liebman, supra note 78, at 7-8, 65. 
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of recent court case publication practices suggest that the scope of 
publication in non-restricted areas is reasonably comprehensive.
82
    
The sample of tax cases discussed below was made possible by 
this recent change in publication practice.
83
 The sample includes 233 
original or edited court documents published between 1987 and 2012, 
some of which combine first-instance and second-instance (regular 
appeals) decisions. Because Chinese appellate decisions tend to 
excerpt first-instance decisions extensively, close to 400 court 
judgments are reflected in the sample.
84
 The number of verdicts per 
year in the sample increased over time—not, we know, because the 
volume of tax litigation increased,
85
 but only because of better 
publication practice of courts. Similarly, the geographical 
distribution of the sample is uneven.
86
 The sample thus shares the 
geographical bias displayed by other recent scholarly attempts to 
analyze large quantities of Chinese case law.
87
 On the other hand, for 
2010, the decisions included in the sample comprise over 20% of all 
tax decisions rendered in China in that year. This relatively high rate 
of publication—remarkable for a civil law country where published 
decisions do not yet fulfill any legal function—was also observed in 
2011 and 2012.
 88
  
 
82
 See Liebman, supra note 78, at 10-11; He & Su, supra note 12, at 127-8. 
83
 However, case gathering ended in May 2013. The sample thus does not 
include tax cases that have come to the public light after that time. 
84
 The 233 documents we collected map onto 190 lawsuits, with the latter 
individuated by reference to whether the same set of parties and facts was 
involved. For several factors we examine in coding the cases, it is not the number 
of decisions, but the number of lawsuits, that are relevant. 
85
 See Chart 1 in Part I supra.  
86
 The city of Shanghai and the province of Henan contribute almost half of 
the documents, while all but 3 of the other 28 provinces each contributed fewer 
than 10. However, the predominance of Henan and Shanghai cases in the sample 
holds only for the years 2009-2011, and has waned by 2012. It is also worth noting 
that there is presently no information about the geographical distribution of tax 
litigation across China, so how unrepresentative the sample is in this regard 
remains unknown.  
87
 See Liebman, supra note 78; He & Su, supra note 12.  
88
 For details, see Cui, supra note 19, at 144-5. By contrast, published 
decisions collected for earlier years represented between only 0.6% and 2.7% of 
actually rendered decisions. Thus for the year 2000, which witnessed the largest 
number of concluded tax cases (2025), only 17 decisions were found.  
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Existing content analyses of Chinese judicial opinions have 
drawn on samples from particular courts and particular years.
89
  
More detrimentally, studies of administrative litigation in particular 
have used samples that are truly small.
90
 While geographical bias is 
still present in the sample of tax cases used here, I tried to expand the 
sample’s coverage both geographically and over time. The longer 
time horizon of the sample especially permits the discovery of 
litigation patterns that take years to unfold.
91
 Finally, given the 
discussion in the last Part, we know that even if all or most court 
judgments are published, they are likely to be unrepresentative of all 
disputes brought to courts, because many lawsuits settle before they 
result in judicial verdicts. In interpreting the findings from the 
sample, therefore, I strive to take the biases that are predicted by trial 
selection theory into account.
 92
 
B. The Findings 
 
Judges have no reason to reveal their lack of independence (if 
that is indeed the case) in their written decisions. Conversely, even if 
judicial verdicts frequently end up in favor of government defendants, 
 
89
 See, e.g., He & Su, supra note 12 (all cases in Shanghai courts for the 
years 2004-9), Liebman, supra note 78 (all criminal cases in one year from two 
courts in Henan).  
90
 See, e.g. Li, supra note 12, at 79 (41 decisions corresponding to 19 tax 
disputes in one province between 2009 and 2011); Xuehua Zhang & Leonard 
Ortolano, Judicial Review of Environmental Administrative Decisions: Has it 
Changed the Behavior of Government Agencies? 64 CHINA J. 97, 102 (2010) (14 
cases from two counties). 
91
 See text accompanying notes 130-133 infra. In the sample, the most 
common types of actions of tax agencies challenged in courts are assessments of 
deficiencies, penalties, and compulsory measures in collection or tax preservation. 
But challenges against a wide variety of other agency actions, such as state 
compensation, denial of administrative reconsideration, government inaction (e.g. 
failure to reward whistleblowers), government information disclosures, are also 
included. 
92
 I calibrate the sample in several ways. First, one recent empirical study of 
Chinese administrative litigation is based on a large sample of cases (not restricted 
to tax) directly gathered from courts, including withdrawn cases and unpublished 
cases. See Huang, supra note 52. It is thus free from publication bias, and I make 
use of relevant results from that study. Second, I find the proportion of two main 
types of defendants in tax litigation, state tax bureaus and local tax bureaus, to be 
roughly consistent between our sample and what is known about the underlying 
dispute population. Third, the types of taxes involved in the sample disputes are 
also consistent with the tax structure in China. For details, see Cui, supra note 19. 
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this may simply be the result of the facts of the cases and applicable 
law, and not of judicial attitudes. Therefore, evidence from published 
cases on whether judicial attitudes or judicial quality determine 
outcome can only be indirect. In the following, I discuss four groups 
of relevant evidence. First, a previous study claimed that because 
Chinese courts can be assumed to lack independence in tax 
adjudication and because potential plaintiffs fear retaliation from tax 
agencies, actually observed cases of tax litigation tend to involve 
exceptional circumstances. The prevalence of such exceptional 
circumstances could thus constitute indirect evidence for judicial bias. 
Therefore, I examine the frequency of such circumstances. Second, 
the trial selection theory discussed earlier suggests that litigants’ 
rational choices with respect to settlement can mask judicial attitudes. 
Therefore I consider the strength of selection effects in the sample, 
focusing on determinants of plaintiff wins. Third, findings relating to 
whether there exists information asymmetry between plaintiffs and 
defendants in tax litigation are discussed. Fourth and finally, I 
discuss what residual evidence there is both for the location of legal 
standards in tax disputes, and for the relationship between the 
judiciary and tax administration.  
1. Does tax litigation involve aberrant behavior?  
 
In a previous study of tax litigation in China, Professor Ji Li 
asserted that it is common knowledge that Chinese courts would 
generally favor defendants in tax disputes, and that anyone suing tax 
collectors would likely face “retaliation”.93 Therefore, he argues, it is 
hardly surprising that few Chinese taxpayers “dare sue” the tax 
collector; what is surprising is why anyone would sue.
94
 Professor Li 
postulates several types of reasons. One is that some plaintiffs are 
“retaliation-proof”: the defendant may have limited jurisdiction over 
the plaintiff and therefore cannot effectively retaliate; or the plaintiff 
literally has “nothing to lose” (the favored example is tax 
whistleblowers who are unemployed social gadflies).
95
 Another is 
that the plaintiff is politically well-connected, which forces the 
adjudicating court to act neutrally.
96
 Yet a third reason is that “high 
 
93
 Li, supra note 12 at 69.  
94
 Id., at 72.  
95
 Id., at 80-6. 
96
 Id. at 99-103. Professor Li simply assumes that otherwise courts need not 
be neutral. 
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stakes” are involved and other channels of conflict resolution are 
closed.
97
 Professor Li’s argument appears to be that unless one of 
these factors is present, litigating against Chinese tax collectors 
would be “irrational”.98  
I investigated these claims in several ways. The first is the 
monetary amount in dispute. In half of the cases in our sample, the 
amounts of tax payment in dispute (not including penalties) are given. 
The smallest such amount is 30 Chinese Yuan (CNY)—
approximately 5 US dollars, while the largest amount is 12,806,105 
CNY. The mean amount disputed is 1,314,541 CNY and median 
138,976 CNY. The following two charts illustrate the distribution of 
disputed amounts. The first chart, covering the entire sample, shows 
that the top two deciles of cases involve disputes over RMB 2 
million or more, which are substantial amounts by any standards. 
The second chart shows that within the bottom half of distribution of 
cases in terms of amount, there is still a significant spread, and once 
the  3rd decile is passed, the disputes amounts are already above 
RMB 20,000. Thus, at least judging by the published decisions, 
many Chinese taxpayers sue tax agencies because non-trivial sums 
are at stake, and not because of antagonisms unrelated to the 
economic value of a dispute.
99 
The distribution of amount disputed is 
also continuous up to the top decile, with no evidence of disputes 
bunching at the low end (due to those plaintiffs who “have nothing to 
lose”) and at the high end (due to those plaintiffs with “high stakes”).  
 
 
97
 Id. at 86-103. It is not clear why this explanation of the occurrence of 
many lawsuits would not apply generally to all legal systems, and why it explains 
the special pattern of litigation in China.     
98
 Id. at 75. Professor Li claims to find at least one such factor in each of the 
19 cases he studies. 
99
 The preponderance of disputes involving small amounts at the bottom half 
of the distribution is also consistent with experiences in other countries.
 
See, e.g. 
DUBROFF & HELLWIG, supra note 27, at 5034, reports that “small cases” 
consistently represented around 50% of all cases in the U.S. Tax Court in recent 
years. Small tax cases in the U.S. tax court are cases involving less than $50,000 a 
year. Lederman, supra note 64, at 901. In Canada, more than half of Tax Court 
cases were brought using the informal procedure, which is available only when the 
amount of federal tax and penalties in dispute is $25,000 or less. Alarie & Green, 
supra note 15, at 995-6.  
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Thus the majority of the cases do not involve plaintiffs “with 
low incomes and revenues [who] are relatively immune to the 
agencies' retaliation threats.”100 In theory, cases with larger amounts 
in dispute may be more likely to go to trial,
101
 and thus the sample of 
published cases may not be representative of the underlying 
population.
102
  Therefore I also specifically reviewed for evidence 
that the plaintiff has low income or low levels of wealth, and found 
this to be the case only in 5 out of 190 cases.  
I also tested Professor Li’s claim that potential plaintiffs in 
China would not sue the agencies that routinely regulate them, for 
fear of retaliation, and therefore that many actual lawsuits involve 
 
100
 Li, supra note 12 at 75.  Such plaintiffs presumably would not be suing 
for such large amounts 
101
 In the model of Priest and Klein, supra note 9, taking trial and settlements 
costs as constant, the larger the amount in dispute, the more likely that a given 
difference in the estimated probability of outcomes by the plaintiff and defendant 
will result in a sufficiently large divergence in the expected values of judgments.  
102
 Note that Professor Li also drew his evidence from a small number of 
published cases.  
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taxpayers and tax agencies that dealt on a one-time basis. I 
specifically attempted to determine whether the defendant in a case 
has regular jurisdiction over the plaintiff taxpayer. In the 135 cases in 
which it is possible to make this determination, the defendant is the 
regular tax administrator over the plaintiff in 100 cases. Thus it is 
overwhelmingly disputes involving locals that are adjudicated. The 
idea that only the “out-of-towner”, so to speak, sues the tax collector 
(along with local social misfits) finds no support in the sample.  This 
appears to be a robust result since parties that deal on a routine basis 
should have more incentives to stay out of court or to settle during 
litigation. Therefore the various stages of trial selection—for the 
commencement of a lawsuit and for getting to a verdict—should 
screen out many disputes among locals and ensure that they are 
under-represented, instead of over-represented, in decided cases.  
Finally, close to 60% of the cases in the sample studied involve 
individual plaintiffs. This percentage likely understates the 
proportion of individuals bringing suit, since individuals are more 
likely to withdraw a lawsuit (i.e. settle with the defendant) than other 
types of plaintiffs.
103
 Among the plaintiffs that are entities, 72% are 
non-state-owned, private firms. While some individual and private 
firm plaintiffs may be politically well-connected,
104
 claiming that 
plaintiffs would not sue tax collectors but for being politically well-
connected seems far-fetched. Overall, political connections and 
plaintiff “retaliation-proofness” offer at best marginal explanations 
of why tax litigation happens in China. 
2. Evidence of selection effects  
 
 
103
 Huang, supra note 52, at 81. In Huang’s sample (which covers 2,767 
administrative litigation cases, though only 28 of which were tax litigation) 79.5% 
of plaintiffs were individuals. Id, at 77. The under-representation of individuals in 
published decisions was also a feature of the case sample analyzed in Pei, supra 
note 11. 
104
 Some studies have suggested that politically well-connected Chinese 
firms are more likely to go to court in general (not just for purposes of suing 
government agencies). Yuen Yuen Ang & Nan Jia, Perverse Complementarity: 
Political Connections and the Use of Courts among Chinese Private Firms, 76 J. 
POLIT. 318 (2014). Note, however, that this may be little different from patterns 
observed in other countries. See B. Zorina Khan, “To Have and Have Not”: Are 
Rich Litigious Plaintiffs Favored in Court? (NBER Working Paper No. 20945/Feb. 
2015), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w20945 (studying civil litigation in 
Maine from the Colonial period through to the Civil War, and showing that 
wealthier individuals engaged in litigation more). 
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According to trial selection theory, rational litigants will take 
any information regarding judicial bias into account when deciding 
whether to go to trial. If both the plaintiff and the defendant expect 
the deciding judge to be biased against the plaintiff, they will settle 
instead of going to trial (thus saving the cost of litigation). 
Consequently, the judge’s bias may not end up being reflected in 
decided cases; any judicial bias can be observed in published 
decisions only where such filtering through litigants’ choices fails to 
be effective.
105
 Although, for reasons discussed below,
106
 it is 
presently not possible to implement any quantitative measure of 
judicial bias for Chinese administrative litigation, it makes sense to 
consider whether the selection effect of litigant choices is strong 
enough in tax litigation that any such bias would be masked 
anyway.
107
 
I find some evidence for the selection effect in the case sample. 
As argued in Part II.A. supra, lawsuits preceded by administrative 
appeal (AR) are less likely to settle during litigation. This implies 
that disputes preceded by AR may be over-represented in published 
court verdicts relative to its proportion in all lawsuits (only cases that 
are not settled receive judicial verdicts). This prediction is confirmed 
by the sample: in 50% of the cases, the disputes either went through 
or an application for AR was rejected by an reviewing agency. This 
is significantly higher than the figure reported in a study based on a 
more representative sample of published and unpublished disputes, 
where only 36% of tax disputes were reported to be preceded by 
AR.
108
  
Another kind of evidence seems to confirm the selection effect 
of AR. Our sample captures 254 first-instance judicial decisions.
109
 
 
105
 John M. de Figueiredo, Strategic Plaintiffs and Ideological Judges in 
Telecommunications Litigation, 21 J. LAW ECON. ORGAN. 501 (2005). 
106
 See text accompanying notes 121-126 infra.  
107
 The evidence presented in Part II.B for the trial selection theory is based 
on aggregate data and on diachronic variations. Here I consider whether this effect 
is manifest in sample cases themselves. 
108
 Huang, supra note 52, at 80. 
109
 Because many decisions on appeal report the decisions of the first-
instance courts, it is possible to code for some aspects of such first-instance 
decisions even though they are not directly available. Thus 272 first-instance 
dispositions are captured in the sample, included 49 summary dismissals and 18 
permissions to withdraw. Consistently with the calculation described in Part I, 
summary dismissals are included as a kind of judicial verdict (thus in the 
denominator for computing plaintiff wins) but permissions to withdraw are not. 
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Among these, the plaintiff win rate is 18.4%.
110
 This is somewhat 
higher than the average rate of plaintiff wins in Chinese tax litigation 
over recent years.
111
 In disputes involving penalties, however, the 
plaintiff win rate is even higher. 57 out of 190 of the lawsuits in the 
sample implicated penalties. First instance courts reversed the 
penalties in 21 cases (sustaining in part and reversing in part in 4 
more.) This is a significantly higher win rate for plaintiffs than on 
average, and it may not be coincidental: as discussed in Section II.A, 
penalty decisions can be appealed to courts directly without going 
through AR; thus the filtering effect of AR—which suppresses 
observed plaintiff win rates—does not apply.112  
3. Evidence for information asymmetry between plaintiffs and 
defendants  
 
An interesting set of results from the analysis of published cases 
relates to information asymmetry between plaintiffs and defendants. 
Under the trial selection theory, if the defendant enjoys an 
information advantage regarding issues relevant to trial outcome—
e.g. it possesses private information about the facts implicated in the 
disputes (e.g. whether the defendant was negligent), greater 
knowledge about judicial attitudes, and so on—it will make more 
informed decisions about settlement, adopt more effective strategies 
when bargaining with plaintiffs, etc., all of which will result in a 
lower observed plaintiff win rate. In tax and other administrative 
litigation, it is possible that the defendants systematically enjoy 
 
110
 119 decisions in our sample were rendered by courts on appeals. Among 
these, the plaintiff win rate was 20%. 
111
 See Chart 2 supra.  
112
 The importance of the trial selection theory is illustrated by this last 
discussion. Without applying such a theory, one might be tempted to explain why 
Chinese courts are more willing to hold against tax agencies in penalty cases than 
in other cases in terms of judicial attitudes or judicial quality. For example, perhaps 
penalty cases more often involve intuitive judgments about fairness (i.e. “Was the 
penalty commensurate with the taxpayer’s fault?”)  And judges are perhaps less 
willing to defer to tax agencies in respect of such judgements than in respect of 
more “technical” judgments about the proper tax treatment of various transactions. 
Moreover, since the impositions of penalties tend to be subject to more stringent 
administrative procedures, judges may seem especially well positioned to 
safeguard procedural (as opposed to substantive) justice. However, such 
hypotheses about the effect of judicial quality on litigation outcome may well be 
spurious, given the existence of another theory that simultaneously explains a 
much wider range of phenomena. 
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information advantages. In particular, tax agencies may have good 
knowledge of the law regardless of whether they have attorney 
representation, since enforcing the law is their job. By contrast, 
taxpayer plaintiffs (especially those that have been assessed 
deficiencies) are likely to be adequately informed about the law only 
when they engage attorneys. This hypothesis is partially supported in 
the U.S. context, where it has been found that attorney representation 
of taxpayers in Tax Court proceedings significantly reduced the IRS 
recovery rate.
113
  
In the 233 judicial documents I analyzed, plaintiffs are 
represented by attorneys in 113 instances, and act pro se in the 
remaining 120 cases.
114
  Two different statistical tools (crosstab and 
multivariate logit regression) show that plaintiff attorney 
representation is significantly (at the .001 level) and negatively 
correlated with whether the plaintiff is an individual, and 
significantly (at the .05 level) and positively correlated with whether 
the case was preceded by AR.
115
 In other words, individual plaintiffs, 
as well as plaintiffs who have brought suit directly instead of going 
through AR, are less likely to hire attorneys.
116
 Interestingly, plaintiff 
representation significantly (at the .05 level) increase the chance that 
the plaintiff will make a procedural argument in the case.
117
 There is 
some evidence, therefore, that hiring attorneys helps mitigate 
plaintiffs’ information disadvantage, and the greater than half of 
plaintiffs who failed to hire attorneys did so to their own detriment. 
 
113
 Lederman & Hrung, supra note 15, at 1255. 
114
 It is conceivable that cases with plaintiff attorney representation involve 
more elaborate fact finding and legal interpretation, and that courts are more likely 
to publish elaborate cases. In combination, these factors suggest that the proportion 
of plaintiff attorney representation is over-stated in published cases. 
115
 In the multivariate analysis, I used two additional independent variables 
as controls: whether the dispute took place in an urban (as opposed to rural) area, 
and the monetary amount disputed. Neither of these variables turned out to have 
any significant correlation with either plaintiff or defendant attorney 
representation. The independent variables also bear no significant correlations with 
one another, dispelling concerns about multi-collinearity in the multivariate 
regressions. 
116
 This is consistent with the pattern in the descriptive statistics in Huang, 
supra note 52: entity plaintiffs are much more likely to engage attorneys than 
individual plaintiffs.  
117
 Plaintiff representation is also positively correlated with the outcome of 
an adverse ruling against the defendant using a simple crosstab measure, although 
this effect disappears using the more rigorous multivariate logit analysis. 
Does Judicial Independence Matter?  
34   
Defendants’ representation by lawyers turns out to be an entirely 
different story. In the sample, tax agencies hired attorneys more 
frequently than plaintiffs—in 131 of the cases. However, whether a 
defendant engaged attorneys shows no significant correlation with 
whether the lawsuit was preceded by AR or with other independent 
variables (e.g. the location or amount in dispute). Moreover, 
defendant representation by lawyers has no significant impact on the 
likelihood of the defendant mounting a procedural defense. Finally, 
defendant attorney representation even seems positively correlated 
(under crosstab) with an adverse ruling against the government—the 
governing hiring a lawyer is more likely to lead to a government 
loss—although a more rigorous multivariate analysis shows that it 
simply has no effect on case outcome. Whether external attorney 
offers any “value added” to tax agencies defendants, therefore, is 
quite unclear. 
These patterns can be interpreted as evidence that tax agencies 
are themselves aware of the relevant procedural rules even without 
external legal support. In another recent empirical study of Chinese 
administrative litigation, the average frequency of attorney 
representation of defendants across agencies was 30%.
118
 This is 
much lower than the frequency (57%) of defendant attorney 
representation in our tax sample. The author of that study, Professor 
Huang Qihui, argued that because government agencies both have in-
house lawyers and are repeat-players in litigation, they are less likely 
to hire attorneys than plaintiffs. In other words, external lawyers may 
not provide enough “value added” for government defendants. This 
view is consistent with the observed effect of defendant attorney 
representation in our sample. It could also explain why tax agencies’ 
choice about whether to have attorney representation seems more 
random than that of plaintiffs.
119
  
4. Legal standards and judicial bias  
 
Notwithstanding the selection effects of both pre-litigation 
proceedings and settlements during litigation, and notwithstanding 
 
118
 Huang, supra note 52, at 78.  
119
 If external attorneys provide relatively little value added, there should also 
be little selection bias that would result in defendant attorney engagement being 
over-represented in case samples. This raises the possibility that tax agencies in 
fact engage lawyers in litigation more often than other agencies, despite (or 
perhaps because of) the low volume of tax litigation. 
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the general brevity of Chinese court decisions,
120
 it is possible to 
glean evidence from the large sample of tax cases regarding the legal 
standards applicable to disputes between taxpayers and tax 
administrators, the judicial application of these standards, and even 
the reactions of the executive branch of government towards tax 
litigation.   
At the outset, however, it is worth noting that the method for 
empirically studying judicial bias most commonly employed in U.S. 
scholarship is not feasible in China.
121
 In empirical tests of the 
“attitudinal model” of judicial behavior—particularly to test the 
hypothesis that the decisions of judges can be predicted from their 
political party affiliation or ideology—scholars usually examine the 
decisions of a small number of judges in a large number of cases.
122
 
In this approach, the large quantity of decisions associated with each 
judge dilutes the effect on case outcome of the merits of particular 
cases. The relatively small number of judges involved, meanwhile, 
makes it feasible to gather personal information about each of them. 
The theoretical validity of this approach to testing the attitudinal 
model is controversial.
123
 But even if it is valid (when properly used), 
it would be difficult to implement in China. Chinese judges’ role in 
most types of adjudication is much less individualistic than in the 
U.S.; the role of individual courts is much more prominent.
124
 
Moreover, even if relevant, the personal characteristics of judges in 
the thousands of lower-level courts that adjudicate almost all of the 
first- and second-instance lawsuits are difficult to gather.
 125
 Finally, 
 
120
 The average length of decisions in the sample is fewer than 3,000 Chinese 
characters (the equivalent, if translated, to not much more than 2,000 English 
words).  
121
 Indeed, such method may not be deployable in most countries with civil 
law judiciaries and less individualistic judges. 
122
 See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND 
THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002); CROSS, supra note 2.  
123
 There is a particular acute question of whether it can be reconciled with 
the trial selection theory. See de Figueiredo, supra note 105.  
124
 See, generally, Liebman, supra note 78.  
125
 In J. MARK RAMSEYER & ERIC B. RASMUSEN, MEASURING JUDICIAL 
INDEPENDENCE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF JUDGING IN JAPAN (2003), 
Professors Ramseyer and Rasmusen studied the Japanese judiciary, which is much 
smaller and more elite in composition than China’s corp of over 200,000 court 
employees. They provided evidence that Japanese judges could decide cases 
independently in tax and other subject matter areas, by using data about the judges’ 
promotions, demotions, and career stagnations. Such data is not available in China 
and thus this approach for studying judicial independence is also not feasible. 
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in almost all areas of administrative litigation—tax is only one most 
extreme example in this regard—the case volume is sufficiently low, 
and case publication practice sufficiently recent, that not many cases 
can be attributed to the same court. For example, in 2013, when all 
administrative lawsuits are combined, there are on average fewer 
than 40 cases for each of the over 3,000 Chinese basic-level courts, 
and there is approximately one tax case for every nine such courts.
126
   
The evidence we have, therefore, is circumstantial. Two types of 
weak evidence for judicial bias in favor of the government can be 
reported. First, in many cases in the sample, judges displayed strong 
deference to tax agencies on matters of legal interpretation, to the 
detriment of plaintiffs. This is especially apparent in a substantial 
number of decisions (69 of them) where the agency actions 
challenged were partially based informal agency guidance. 
According to the SPC’s position, such guidance lacks the formal 
force of law and is not binding on courts.
127
 In a number of these 
cases, plaintiffs requested the courts to disregard allegedly 
inappropriate informal guidance, and the courts declined to do so 
even though they had the power to.  However, it must be recognized 
that judicial deference to administrative agencies in statutory 
interpretation is widespread even in mature legal systems, and can 
clearly be compatible with judicial independence.
128
 Moreover, the 
more statutes (or law with equivalent force) delegates authority to 
administrative agencies to engage in rulemaking and legal 
interpretation, the harder it will be for courts to contravene the 
exercise of such delegated power. Thus it is not clear that the 
prevalence of judicial deference in tax cases should be blamed on 
judicial weakness as opposed to excessive statutory delegation.
129
 
 
126
 The decisions of 133 different courts in China are represented in the case 
sample studied here. Even courts that published the largest number of tax cases in 
the sample (two intermediate courts in Shanghai) only had 9 and 8 cases each.  
127
 The legal status of informal agency guidance and the SPC’s position with 
respect to such guidance is extensively discussed in Nicolas Howson, Enforcement 
without Foundation? Insider Trading and China's Administrative Law Crisis, 60 
AM. J. COMP. 955 (2012), and Wei Cui, What is the “Law” in Chinese Tax 
Administration? 19 ASIA PAC. LAW REV. 75 (2011). 
128
 See KRISTIN E. HICKMAN & RICHARD J. PIERCE JR., FEDERAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS, CHAPTER 6 (2D ED. 2014); Kristin 
E., Hickman, IRB Guidance: The No Man’s Land of Tax Code Interpretation, 2009 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 239 (2009).  
129
 On excess statutory delegation in Chinese tax law, see Cui, supra note 
127. Note also that, in our case sample, there were at least 30 instances where 
courts ruled that tax agencies misapplied the law. 
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A second weak indication of judicial bias is the courts’ response 
to procedural arguments. In 77 decisions in the sample, plaintiffs 
raised procedural challenges against agency actions, but this led to 
adverse rulings against agencies only in 13 instances. Defendants 
made defenses on procedural grounds also in a significant number of 
cases, which resulted in favorable rulings for the defendants in 2/3 of 
the cases (43 out of 66). However, in 7 decisions, courts 
spontaneously (i.e. without the plaintiffs raising relevant challenges) 
made adverse rulings against agencies on procedural grounds. 
Without studying the merits of all these procedural claims (which 
often require knowledge of facts not sufficiently disclosed in the 
decisions), the evidence is not conclusive.  
On the other hand, the sample also contains cases that reflect the 
executive branch’s view of judicial independence. Of particular 
interest are clusters of cases where a specific type of disputes is 
repeatedly brought to courts over time, and where the government 
appears to have changed the law in reaction to litigation. An 
important advantage of longitudinal coverage of the case sample 
assembled here is that it allows one to observe such shifts in legal 
standards.  
One such cluster of cases relates to the treatment of innocent 
third parties in detected VAT fraud. A prevalent type of VAT fraud 
in China is the sham issuance of VAT invoices.
130
 Although both 
criminal and civil penalties apply to those who issue sham invoices, 
beginning in 1995 the Chinse tax authority applied an adverse rule 
against buyers who receive such invoices: any invoice that is the 
product of a sham issuance cannot be used to claim input credits by 
buyers, regardless of whether the buyer is aware of the sham 
issuance.
131
 That is, even innocent buyers, who receive VAT 
invoices from purported sellers who signed real contracts with the 
 
130
 For purposes other than criminal law, a sham issuance encompasses 
issuing, for oneself or for others, or allowing others to issue for oneself, invoices 
that are “inconsistent with actual business affairs”. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo 
Fapiao Guanli Banfa(《中华人民共和国发票管理办法》 ) [Measures for 
Managing Invoices] (promulgated by the State Council, as revised by State 
Council Decree 587, 20 December 2010, and effective on February 1, 2011). A 
sham issuance is distinguished from producing forged VAT invoices—the invoice 
issued is authentic, it just does not correspond to actual transactions. This area of 
substantive Chinese tax law is discussed in ALAN SCHENK ET AL, VALUE ADDED 
TAX: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 467-73 (2015) (Chapter 14, Section VI.C).  
131
 This is a punitive outcome for taxpayers even if no explicit penalty is 
imposed: they would need to bear a sizeable tax burden that normally would be 
passed on to downstream producers or consumers. 
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buyers, delivered the specified goods, and provided invoices that 
correspond perfectly with the transactions from the buyers’ 
perspectives, are denied input credit if the invoices turn out to be 
issued in a sham.
132
 This controversial “buyer strict liability” regime 
gave rise to repeated disputes between taxpayers and tax authorities, 
some of which went into litigation. In our sample, four cases, 
litigated at different times and in different parts of China, presented 
such fact patterns. In all three cases tried before 2009, the plaintiffs 
(all innocent buyers) argued (correctly) that the tax authority’s rules 
lacked basis in the law. In all three lawsuits, courts in the first 
instance and on appeal held for the government and found ways to 
deflect plaintiff arguments about the legal infirmities of the tax 
agencies’ policies. One could interpret this either as a sign of the lack 
of judicial independence, or as a normal example of judicial 
deference to the executive branch. But more interestingly, the 
national government, when it revised the relevant VAT regulations in 
2008, deliberately changed the legal standard. Whereas the old VAT 
regulation did not provide support for the informal policy of tax 
agencies regarding sham issuances, the new regulation endorsed the 
effectiveness of such informal policy, making it much harder for a 
taxpayer to challenge it. Not coincidently, in the fourth case in our 
sample, the plaintiff was not able to advance this legal argument.
133
  
There are other clusters of cases in our sample that illustrate the 
same pattern: the government was challenged in court on the basis of 
the legal infirmities of some of its policies (and occasionally suffered 
 
132
 This could happen, for example, unknowingly to the buyer, the purported 
seller was not the owner of the goods sold and was simply acting on behalf of 
someone else (who is not able to issue VAT invoices). 
133
 This legal issue continues to be litigated and new cases have emerged not 
contained in the original sample. See Anhui Sheng Hefei Shi Luyang Qu Renmin 
Fayuan Xingzheng Panjue Shu (安徽省合肥市庐阳区人民法院行政判决书) 
[Anhui Province Hefei City Luyang District People’s Court Administrative 
Litigation Decision], Lu Xing Chuzi Di 00032 Hao (庐行初字第 00032号) [Lu 
Administrative Trial Decision No.00032] (2014). Jinhu Shengjin Tongye Youxian 
Gongsi yu Huaian Shi Guojia Shuiwu Ju Jicha Ju Xingzheng Chufa Ershen 
Xingzheng Panjue Shu (金湖盛锦铜业有限公司与淮安市国家税务局稽查局行
政处罚二审行政判决书) [Jinhu Shengjin Copper Company Ltd. v. Huaian City 
State Taxation Bureau Tax Inspection Department Administrative Penalty Second 
Instance Administrative Litigation Decision], Jiangsu Sheng Huaian Shi Zhongji 
Renmin Fayuan Xingzheng Panjue Shu (江苏省淮安市中级人民法院行政判决书
) [Jiangsu Province Huaian City Intermediate People’s Court Administrative 
Litigation Decision], Huai Zhong Xing Zhongzi Di 0139 Hao (淮中行终字第
0139号) [Huai Intermediate Administrative Final Decision] (2014). 
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legal defeat); subsequently the law was amended in the government’s 
favor to fix the previous infirmity. For instance, certain tax agency 
penalty practices that evolved in the late 1990s were subject to court 
challenges, and such practices prevailed only after being codified in 
statute.
134
 Similarly, the authority of local tax inspection bureau to 
assess taxes was challenged until the late 1990s, and such authority 
was given statutory grounding in 2000 upon the revision of the Law 
on the Administration of Tax Collection.
135
 Indeed, in this last set of 
disputes, tax authorities had seemed to be threatened with systematic 
defeat before the statute was changed, as the Chinese Supreme 
People’s Court had indicated that it believed that the law was not on 
the government’s side.136  
The claim here is not that in all these cases where the law was 
revised, the revision was a causal consequence of government 
defeats in courts or even of the government being challenged in 
courts. It is instead that the government could ultimately protect 
itself against legal vulnerabilities in court by changing the law, and 
this is what Chinese tax authorities have often done. In other words, 
there are two contrasting views regarding potential legal disputes 
between Chinese taxpayers and tax agencies. One is that even if the 
taxpayer has strong legal arguments, no good will come from 
bringing such a dispute to court, because Chinese courts are not 
independent and the defendant tax agencies will retaliate. The other 
is that if taxpayers have good legal arguments on a particular issue, 
then disputes on such issues are likely to arise often. The government 
may hope that it will not be sued as a result of such disputes, and that 
 
134
 For discussion, see Wei Cui & Xiaoyu Ma, The Option to Sue: Hainan 
Oriental Hotel v. Hainan Local Tax Bureau, 6 CHINA TAX INTELLIGENCE 20 
(2011). 
135
 The evolution of this dispute is discussed in Li Gang (李刚), Quanguo 
Tongyi Shuishou Zhifa Wenshu Shiyang Ruogan Wenti Yanjiu (全国统一税收执法
文书式样若干问题研究) [Investigation of Several Issues on the Style of the 
National Uniform Writ of Tax Collection], 12 CAISHUI FALUN CONG (财税法论丛) 
[FINANCE AND TAX LAW] 178, 193-99 (2012). 
136
 Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Dui Fujian Sheng Gaoji Renmin Fayuan “Guanyu 
Fujian Sheng Difang Shuiwu Ju Jicha Fenju Shifou Juyou Xingzheng Zhuti Zige 
de Qingshi Baogao” de Dafu Yijian (最高人民法院对福建省高级人民法院《关
于福建省地方税务局稽查分局是否具有行政主体资格的请示报告》的答复意
见) [Supreme People’s Court Reply to the High People’s Court of Fujian Province 
Regarding the Inquiry of the Standing of Tax Inspection Office of Local Tax 
Bureau as the Administrative Body], Xing Ta [1999] 25 Hao (行他[1999]25号) 
[Xing Ta [1999] No. 25], (promulgated and effective on 21 October 1999). 
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if sued, the courts will side with it, but ultimately, disputes, lawsuits, 
and court defeats can be avoided only by changing the law. Overall, 
existing case law provides more support for the second, rather than 
the first, view.
137
 
C. Summary  
 
To review: if a Chinese taxpayer, considering bringing a lawsuit 
against a tax agency, hires a good lawyer to review published 
decisions in tax litigation, they would find that many prior litigants 
are normal businesses typical of what one finds in the marketplace. 
They would find courts considering some fairly sophisticated legal 
arguments advanced by both plaintiffs and defendants. Courts hold 
against tax agencies with non-negligible frequency—in one fifth of 
the cases overall and one third of the penalty cases—but the odds of 
winning is evidently lower for plaintiffs than for defendants. Why 
the plaintiffs lose, however, are generally not mysterious: either the 
law simply seems not to be on their side, or tax agencies are 
enforcing policies and practices that are adverse to the plaintiffs, 
have inadequate basis in the law, but which presumably are applied 
to all taxpayers and not just the plaintiffs. Courts are reluctant to 
invalidate these informal practices (although they occasionally do 
precisely that). Aside from this, there is little general evidence for 
courts’ lack of neutrality or competence. Adverse legal standards 
seem much more relevant than judicial attitude or quality. Finally 
and most importantly, if the taxpayer and his lawyer are able to 
conclude that they have a strong case on the merits, there is nothing 
in the published cases (more than half of which involved pro se 
plaintiffs) that implies that they should preclude the litigation option. 
Why, then, do Chinese taxpayers tend not to bring suit? Are 
legal standards so generally adverse to taxpayers that they rarely 
have a good case?
138
 How, then, do Chinese taxpayers normally 
survive? The next Part suggests what is likely to be a surprising 
answer to these questions. 
 
 
137
 Not all disputes and litigated cases involve issues of policy 
implementation, of course. But when they do not, government incentives for 
interference with independent adjudication seem even weaker. 
138
 In Part II, we saw that while some litigation procedural rules are adverse 
to taxpayer plaintiffs, they are probably insufficient to explain the low volume of 
litigation. 
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IV. THE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT: THE HEART OF THE 
STORY 
 
The social environment in which disputes arise clearly may 
affect the volume of litigation. Professors Ramseyer and Rasmussen 
noted, for example, that the number of pawn shops in Japan declined 
dramatically from 1955 to the present, and as a result the quantity of 
litigation pursued by Japanese creditors increased (since fewer 
creditors are pawnshops that could simply keep pawned objects of 
defaulting debtors).
139
 The challenge, though, is identifying such 
relevant features of the social environment when one’s scope of 
attention begins narrowly with the courts. In the case of Chinese tax 
litigation, such a non-obvious, but potentially key, determinant of 
how disputes arise and are dealt with is the structure of tax 
administration.  
China’s workforce of tax administrators comprises 
approximately 756,000 civil servants.
140
 Although this is certainly 
the largest tax bureaucracy in the world by absolute size,
141
 it is not 
in per capita terms: the number of tax administrators relative to the 
size of the country’s general workforce is much lower than the 
OECD average.
142
 Notwithstanding this fact, the organization of 
China’s tax administration permits most business taxpayers to easily 
contact tax collectors. This is the result of what one might call 
radical “administrative decentralization”.143 The easiest way to 
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 Ramseyer & Rasmussen, supra note 8.  
140
 OECD, TAX ADMINISTRATION 2015: COMPARATIVE INFORMATION ON 
OECD AND OTHER ADVANCED AND EMERGING ECONOMIES 84 (2015) (Table 2.4). 
141
 Id. 
142
 See Appendix in Leslie Robinson & Joel Slemrod, Understanding 
Multidimensional Tax Systems, 19 INT TAX PUBLIC FINAN 237 (2012). Robinson 
and Slemrod’s analysis of OECD data shows that developed countries tend to have 
a much higher number of tax administrators relative to population than developing 
countries.   
143
 Cui, supra note 20. I define “administrative decentralization” by two 
features of the state. First, there is a single bureaucratic hierarchy, and government 
functions viz-a-viz citizens are performed at the lowest levels of the hierarchy. By 
contrast, higher levels of the bureaucracy do not exercise government power with 
respect to citizens directly, but instead issue commands to bureaucratic 
subordinates. Second, the lower the bureaucratic rank, the smaller is the 
geographical reach of units in the rank. Decentralization thus implies that the 
jurisdiction of a particular, citizen-facing government unit is geographically quite 
limited. What is unusual about China is first, how deep (i.e. multilayered) the 
bureaucratic hierarchy is, and second, how resolutely the tasks of government 
administration are placed at the bottom ranks of the hierarchy. Id, at 23.  
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appreciate what this means is to consider the vertical distribution of 
government personnel—what proportions of civil servants are 
employed at the various levels of government. At the national level, 
China’s State Administration of Taxation (SAT) houses just over 800 
staff members—a mere 0.1% of the army of tax administrators. By 
way of contrast, in 2013 the U.S. Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) 
National Office in Washington D.C. employed a staff of 4,072, out 
of a total IRS staff size of 86,977 (i.e. 4.68% of IRS staff work at the 
National Office).
144
 At the next, provincial level, China’s tax 
bureaucracy has 11,000 employees. Thus even when the national and 
provincial offices are combined, employees at these levels represent 
only 1.56% of the tax administration.
 145
  
Where then are China’s tax collectors? Data compiled by the 
SAT shows that in 2003, 16% of tax administrators working at 
subnational levels were posted at prefectural/municipal tax bureaus, 
and an overwhelming 79.5% or more work at the county level or 
below.
146
 Arriving at a breakdown of personnel between the county 
and lower levels takes some guess work, but the latter ranks contain 
at least as many employees as the county rank.
147
  
Imagine what the U.S. IRS would be like if it were structured 
like China’s tax bureaucracy. First, there would be barely anyone in 
the Washington D.C. National Office. There would also be no 
counterparts to the seven current IRS regional offices, each of which 
oversees matters across several states.
148
 Instead, the current 139 IRS 
district offices, which are field offices directly dealing with taxpayers, 
would become high-level offices giving commands to three 
additional layers of subordinate offices, where most personnel would 
be located. Most interestingly, these offices would form a dense 
 
144
 In 2011, the IRS national office employed a staff of 4,569, out of the total 
IRS staff size of 94,709. OECD, supra note 140, at 83 (Table 2.4). 
145
Id. According to a recent OECD study (id.), which covered 35 OECD 
countries and 17 non-OECD countries/regions, China has by far the smallest 
percentage of tax administration staff working either at headquarters (i.e. national) 
offices, or at national and regional offices combined, among the 52 countries 
surveyed. 
146
 Cui, supra note 20. 
147
 Therefore, if one visualizes Chinese tax administration in a pyramidal 
figure with five tiers (national, provincial, prefectural, county, and sub-county), the 
proportions of areas of the tiers from the top to the bottom would have the ratios of 
0.1:1.5:18.4:40:40. The top two tiers would be barely visible. 
148
 IRS, Chapter 13-1 – Exhibit 1 Regional Offices, INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERVICE (Mar. 3, 2015), available at http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-
Businesses-&-Self-Employed/Chapter-13-1-Exhibit-1-Regional-Offices.  
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network that is, so to speak, close to the ground. Instead of having 20 
Taxpayer Assistance Centers in the entire state of New York,
149
 for 
example, there would be 20 such centers just for upper Manhattan.
150
 
Instead of having just two or three hundred field offices in the entire 
country, there would be such a number of offices just in one 
metropolitan area.
151
   
The sheer density of this network of “grass-root” offices implies 
that each of the offices that constitute the network’s nodes has a 
small geographical jurisdiction. Taxpayers in each such small 
jurisdiction is thus in easy physical proximity to an office housing 
tax administrators. What a local office tends to do also accentuates 
this proximity. Although, nominally, the role of a local tax office is 
fairly comprehensive,
152
 in reality the bulk of a local office’s staff 
time and resources are devoted to a range of basic compliance tasks. 
Relatively fine divisions of labor, for example, are found for 
managing taxpayer registration, ensuring the timely filing of tax 
returns and the very basic processing of such returns, ensuring 
prompt payment of taxes, dealing with refund claims, and issuing tax 
invoices.
153
 In addition, the local office is supposed to give publicity 
 
149
 IRS, Contact My Local Office in New York, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 
(Aug. 17, 2015), available at http://www.irs.gov/uac/Contact-My-Local-Office-in-
New-York. Similarly, the State of California has only 28 such centers.  
150
 The Dongcheng District in the City of Beijing 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dongcheng_District,_Beijing), for example, has a 
population of 0.9 million and a geographical area of 40 square kilometers—which 
is roughly half the size of Manhattan in both population and area terms. It has 
twenty taxpayer service centers. See Beijing Shi Guojia Shuiwu Ju (北京市国家税
务局) [Beijing State Taxation Bureau], Dongcheng Qu Shuiwu Tingsuo (东城区税
务厅所) [Dongcheng District Local Taxation Office], BEIJING SHI GUOJIA SHUIWU 
JU (北京市国家税务局) [BEIJING STATE TAXATION BUREAU] (Aug. 17, 2015), 
available at http://www.bjsat.gov.cn/bjsat/qxfj/dc/swts/.  
151
 OECD, supra note 140 (Table 2.4) states that IRS has 139 “regional 
offices” and 119 “local/branch offices”. The City of Beijing itself has more tax 
offices than this total number of 258. 
152
 Cui, supra note 20, at 203-4. 
153
 See, e.g. Shenzhen Shi Nanshan Qu Difang Shuiwu Ju (深圳市南山区地
方税务局) [Shenzhen Nanshan District Local Taxation Bureau], Shenzhen Shi 
Nanshan Qu Difang Shuiwu Ju Shuiwu Shixiang Tiaozheng Gaozhi Shu (深圳市南
山区地方税务局税务事项调整告知书) [Notice of the Shenzhen Nanshan District 
local taxation bureau regarding adjustments to tax-related matters], SHENZHEN 
SHI DIFANG SHUIWU JU (深圳市地方税务局 ) [SHENZHEN LOCAL TAXATION 
BUREAU] (Jul. 13, 2015), available at 
http://www.szds.gov.cn/wap/tzgg/201507/07d8debf75344486a2bd6a20453e5d09.s
html (detailing the functions and services provided by a local tax office). 
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to tax law, and provide taxpayer education, training, and other 
services.
154
 Thus instead of mailing one’s returns and writing checks 
to distant “return processing centers” as U.S. taxpayers do, and in 
addition to being able to dial up the equivalent of IRS service 
hotlines, Chinese taxpayers can handle their basic tax compliance 
and obtain taxpayer services in their neighborhoods. In short, tax 
administration in China possesses a “personal face” to a much 
greater extent than in many other countries.  
The origin of this organizational structure of Chinese tax 
administration are complex.
155
 Suffice it to say that the purpose of 
this structure is not to provide face-to-face taxpayer service, but to 
collect tax revenue in the main ways in which the government knows 
how to.
156
 Moreover, by some measures this system has also worked 
well: close contact with taxpayers has reduced the size of the 
informal sector in China to one of the smallest in the world, and 
Chinese tax revenue has been growing at a faster pace than its GDP 
for almost two decades.
157
 But it has also had many unintended 
implications. For our purposes here, the most important implication 
is for how Chinese taxpayer may choose to learn about and comply 
with tax law.  
Like taxpayers elsewhere, a Chinese taxpayer may consult 
government publications, acquire professional tax advice, or inquire 
with taxpayer service units within the tax administration to learn 
about tax law. But in addition, because of the dense network of local 
tax offices, he is also able to consult with the tax administrators in 
the neighborhood, whom he deals with during routine (e.g. weekly or 
monthly) tax compliance, regarding the latter’s view about how 
certain transactions should be handled.
158
 This latter option offers 
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 Cui, supra note 20, at 204. 
155
 It needs to be traced both to the Chinese government’s attempt to build a 
tax system to embrace a market-based economy in the 1980s and 1990s, and to the 
overall structure of the Chinese state. See id, at 235-6. 
156
 In other words, physical proximity between Chinese taxpayers and tax 
collectors does not mean that the former get better taxpayer services than taxpayers 
in other countries: the primary objective of any local tax office and of most local 
office employees is still to collect revenue. 
157
 Id., at 194, 199. 
158
 In many countries, only a small set of taxpayers, e.g. large corporations 
where audit teams from the tax agency are routinely stationed, have tax 
administration staff specifically assigned to them and deal with them on a routine 
basis. Taxpayers may have access to good taxpayer services, including having 
simple inquiries answered, but the government staff answering the inquiries are not 
the ones that will engage in audits and make tax assessments. 
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two significant advantages. First, it is these officials who are most 
likely to be conducting any examination of the transactions in 
question in the future. Not only may the officials’ view now be a 
relevant predictor of their view in the future, but the officials may 
also feel bound to some extent by their own advice to taxpayers, or at 
least be more reluctant to impose severe penalties if taxpayers turn 
out to own additional taxes. In other words, consulting the local tax 
official about tax law has advantages analogous to obtaining an 
advanced ruling.
159
 Second, learning the law through local tax 
officials is also (considerably) cheaper than hiring tax advisors. By 
relying on local tax officials for legal advice, taxpayers effectively 
convert what would have been their compliance costs into the 
government’s administrative costs.160  
It is likely that many Chinese taxpayers precisely engage in such 
behavior. Moreover, because the grass-root offices offer low career 
incentives to their employees and inadequate opportunities for 
specialization, it is likely that local tax administrators have rather 
imperfect knowledge of tax law.
161
 When this is the case, and when 
taxpayers do not independently learn the tax law, even the most 
“compliant” taxpayers are only “semi-compliant”:  their compliance 
activities are blessed by local tax administrators’ routine intervention 
and (non-binding) advice, but may still substantially deviate from the 
requirements of law. 
Now consider a Chinese taxpayer’s incentives when a dispute 
with the local tax office arises. First, the dispute would be viewed 
from both sides in the context of an ongoing, physically proximal, 
and frequently interactive relationship: how the dispute is resolved is 
likely to affect future interactions, and both sides may prefer not to 
be burdened with continued adverse feelings. Moreover, the prospect 
of future interactions also creates rooms for bargaining in settlement. 
Second, to litigate in court, or even to bring a dispute through a 
formal administrative review proceeding, both sides would need to 
come to terms with what the law requires. Many taxpayers, however, 
have precisely chosen not to do that in regular compliance. Instead, 
by choosing to rely on the local tax office for various compliance 
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efforts, they have benefited from both savings on advisory and 
compliance costs and perhaps even direct tax savings resulting from 
the local tax collectors’ partial ignorance (or discretionary 
application) of the law. Any taxpayer considering becoming a 
plaintiff, therefore, must be prepared to abandon this type of normal 
equilibrium.These two factors—the greater opportunity for 
settlement due to repeated interactions, and the desire that taxpayers 
may have for keeping to a particular type of compliance practice—
may both have powerful effects in suppressing formal dispute 
resolution strictly based on the law.  
Note that these explanations are distinct from the claim that 
taxpayers may hesitate to sue tax agencies for fear of retaliation. To 
begin, a tax agency’s ability to retaliate is presumably constrained by 
law: if a taxpayer can sue an agency in the first place, it can sue the 
same agency for retaliatory actions that have no basis in law. The 
question, then, is whether a defendant (especially one that loses) may 
retaliate within the bounds of law. In China it is plausible that this is 
feasible, but the reason lies in the tax administrators’ deep 
involvement with most taxpayers’ normal compliance activities, and 
the frequency with which taxpayers benefit from such involvement. 
It is not enough that the agency sued retains jurisdiction over the 
taxpayer;
162
 it must be the case that it delivers benefits to taxpayers 
that it could withdraw after being sued. Moreover, in the repeated 
interactions between taxpayers and tax administrators, it is also not 
just the government that can act strategically, e.g. by retaliating: 
taxpayers can also choose different levels of cooperation in response 
to the government’s choices. Thus it is at least as plausible to see the 
suppression of formal disputes as resulting from the expanded space 
for bargaining and reaching settlement as it is to read such 
suppression as a reflection of government power.   
In summary, the low tax litigation volume in China may be 
explainable by the atomistic structure of Chinese tax administration, 
which creates opportunities for frequent informal actions between 
taxpayers and tax administrators. The logic of this explanation might 
extend to other regulatory areas as well. For example, it has been 
noted in a number of studies that in the sphere of environmental 
protection, the level of environmental litigation (including 
administrative litigation) is so low that the maintenance of 
specialized environmental courts, which the Chinese government 
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created in 2011, has been difficult to justify.
163
 It has similarly been 
noted that the penalties imposed on polluters and other violators of 
environmental law are far lower than can be expected from statutory 
provisions.
164
 Fewer scholars have recognized that the organization 
of environment protection agencies in China is very decentralized, in 
ways not dissimilar to the decentralization of tax administration 
discussed above.
165
 But it is plausible that such decentralization is 
also the culprit for low litigation in the environmental area. 
V. ADMINISTRATIVE LITIGATION AND THE RULE OF LAW 
 
Among Chinese policymakers and legal scholars, it is 
conventional wisdom that administrative litigation is not just a 
mechanism for resolving disputes between private parties and 
government entities, disputes that arise because of factual and legal 
disagreements and perhaps simply as a part of life. Administrative 
litigation instead (and perhaps even primarily) serves the function of 
protecting the legal rights and interests of citizens from the 
encroachment of the government. This imputed function implies that 
the government is prone to making such encroachment, and perhaps 
more generally, to acting in ways that significantly deviate from 
what is required by the law. This implied claim is certainly apt in 
characterizing many of the activities of the Chinese government, 
which is far from being tamed by the rule of law.
166
 From this 
perspective, while citizens suing the government may or may not be 
acting purely in their own private interest, such lawsuits may 
generate a kind of social benefit beyond the private benefit for the 
plaintiffs: administrative litigation may deter the government from 
much unlawful activity, or at least help the government to improve 
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its operations through better alignment with the law.
167
  Although 
public law scholars may be unfamiliar with such a formulation, the 
idea is that legal disputes with government agencies have strong 
positive externalities, as they promote a particular social good, 
namely the rule of law in governance.   
It is very likely for this reason that the Chinese government has 
heavily subsidized administrative litigation. The subsidies take 
multiple forms. At the level of individual disputes, court fees for 
administration litigation are negligible (50 yuan or 8 dollars per 
case).
168
 In the institutional dimension, separate tribunals with 
dedicated judges for hearing administrative law disputes are set up at 
courts at all levels, resulting in an average case load of fewer than 40 
a year for such tribunals.
169
 The judicial system also separately 
gathers and publishes data on administrative litigation, which made 
possible the analysis in Parts I and II supra. Moreover, a large 
number of Chinese legal scholars specialize in research on how to 
make administrative litigation more effective at promoting the rule of 
law, for example by modifying the Administrative Litigation Law to 
offer more plaintiff rights and remedies.
170
  As a part of the judicial 
apparatus that receives such targeted subsidies, administrative 
litigation is clearly a distinct institution with a distinct purpose.   
In tax and many other areas, however, what paradoxically seems 
to be preventing this institution from serving its purpose is the 
shortage of plaintiffs. Missing (often) are the very parties whose 
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rights and interests administrative litigation is supposed to protect. 
Courts cannot by themselves constrain government and promote the 
rule of law in the executive branch, unless private parties 
spontaneously bring suits. This point may seem obvious, but it is also 
precisely ignored when one assumes that if only courts are more 
neutral, competent, and particularly more independent and “powerful” 
vis-à-vis the executive branch, or the procedures for litigation are 
made more plaintiff-favorable, the lawsuits would naturally happen. 
The investigation carried out in this Article into the actual empirical 
patterns of Chinese tax litigation shows that this kind of assumption 
may have little justification in reality. Just as subsidizing 
administrative litigation hasn’t made it the institution it is intended to 
be, improving judicial quality and independence may not, either. The 
actions and choices of would-be-plaintiffs cannot be forgotten.   
The empirical considerations discussed in Parts II to IV suggest 
two reasons why administrative litigation may be deprived of its 
significance. The first, more straightforward, reason is that the laws 
that courts would enforce may be unfavorable to would-be plaintiffs: 
the judiciary cannot uphold rights that private parties do not have. 
Thus if Chinese tax law imposes many compliance requirements on 
taxpayers, taxpayers who flunk such requirements cannot expect 
much by way of judicial remedy.  
The second, more profound reason why the significance of 
administrative litigation may diminish is that private parties may 
themselves benefit from, come to terms with, and perpetuate a social 
order that is inconsistent with the rule of law. Most obviously, 
thieves, tax evaders, polluters, unscrupulous merchants and 
opportunistic businesses all benefit from ineffective law enforcement. 
But equally importantly, many private citizens may prefer to be 
spared the costs of learning and complying with the law, if they have 
the opportunity to do so. As discussed in Part IV, if a taxpayer can 
obtain a significant amount of free tax advice and free assistance 
with return preparation at a local tax office—even if offering such 
free services is not the intended function of such offices—they may 
happily follow the personal discretion of the local civil servants, 
particularly if they don’t end up paying more tax. Indeed, they may 
actively seek access to such discretion, more than they try to learn 
about the law. When incentives for doing so are pervasive, 
“constraining government” may often not felt by citizens to be in 
their own interest. They may readily leave their supposed rights 
simply on the books.  
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While it may ultimately be the government’s responsibility to 
put an end to this kind of non-rule-based social practice, it is 
important to recognize that the problem here is the rule of law has 
failed in a much more fundamental sense than unconstrained (or 
under-constrained) government: the failure rather lies in there being 
no publicly announced legal rules that are generally followed. The 
making and publicizing of legal rules, and achieving general 
compliance with these rules, form the pre-conditions of and general 
backgrounds to large-scale social coordination in many countries 
(democratic or authoritarian) in the 21
st
 century. They are also pre-
conditions of the functioning of judicial institutions in these 
countries. Where both the government and private citizens opt for 
personal discretion and informal bargaining instead of rule-based 
social practices, courts that are supposed to enforce legal rules may 
end up being little used. 
Of course, it is not only Chinese policymakers and legal scholars 
who tend to identify judicial monitoring of executive action as the 
locus for promoting the rule of law. The idea of “rule of law” is 
frequently associated with “constraining government” in discourses 
around the world. This Article has shown, however, that because the 
very possibility of judicial monitoring is conditional upon plaintiffs 
bringing suit, and because whether plaintiffs bring suit in the first 
place may depend on whether legal rules are generally being 
complied with by private citizens and effectively enforced by the 
government—that is, whether legal rules guide social and economic 
life—the rule of law is far from being synonymous with 
“constraining government”.  
As mentioned in the Introduction, some scholars studying 
administrative litigation have also taken theoretical perspectives 
different from the one just described. They see administrative 
litigation as a distinctive institution, but not because it (purportedly) 
produces a distinctive public good, namely more rule of law in 
governance (or a more constrained government). Instead, in the 
context of authoritarian regimes, they see administrative litigation 
either as furnishing a meaningful tool for the “principals” in the 
regimes to monitor the actions of their “agents”,171 or as an 
inadvertent opening for those who oppose the regimes to pursue 
political contest.
172
 In the former case, a narrative is then developed 
to predict how authoritarian regimes may choose among different 
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forms of monitoring. In the latter case, a new kind of normative 
significance, beyond the rule of law, is bestowed upon administrative 
litigation: such litigation may undermine authoritarianism itself.  
The weaknesses of these theoretical claims, which can readily be 
seen purely in conceptual terms, are put into sharp relief by 
considering the realities of administrative litigation. The main 
problem with the “third-party monitoring for the benefit of dictators” 
story is that the objective of such monitoring is presumably catching 
malfeasance by agents of the authoritarian regime.
173
 However, it is 
not clear why courts are particularly adept at catching official 
malfeasance, especially when administrative litigation proceedings 
and not criminal prosecution are involved.
174
 Moreover, since courts 
are reactive, plaintiffs are needed to detect the instances of 
malfeasance first. The key “third party” in judicial monitoring, in 
other words, is the plaintiff, not the judge. It is not clear that the 
remedies that courts typically provide to plaintiffs in administrative 
litigation give distinctively strong incentives for monitoring official 
malfeasance. Given these facts, whistleblower or ombudsman 
systems with rewards appear much more suitable for the purpose of 
third-party monitoring from the perspective of authoritarian 
principals. The choice of administrative litigation for such purpose 
would be inexplicable.  
As to the story of administrative litigation as a form of political 
contest, the overwhelming evidence from China is that citizens do 
not see things that way. As heavily subsidized as the institution of 
administrative litigation is, it is still infrequently used in many areas. 
Chinese citizens’ disinclination to challenge one of the most 
pervasive—and purposefully extractive—branches of the 
government, namely taxation, is hard to ignore. Instead of citizens 
using a seemingly neutral and apolitical channel—that of law—to 
pursue political purposes, the very functioning of administrative 
litigation as a legal mechanism is threatened by its disuse, for reasons 
that have no discernible connection with politics. 
CONCLUSION 
At the outset of this Article, I presented a contrast in how 
administrative litigation is viewed in democracies with established 
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rule of law, on the one hand, and in countries that are characterized 
either by authoritarianism or by deficient legal systems, on the other. 
In the former context, administrative litigation often does not stand 
out as a distinctive institution, but instead merges seamlessly into a 
background characterized by the rule of law. In the latter, 
administrative litigation is often portrayed as an aspirational 
institution, as capable of either promoting the rule of law or 
undermining authoritarianism. Consequently, it may be showered 
with subsidies (sometimes even by the governments it is supposed to 
reform themselves) and highlighted for political support by 
international rule of law initiatives. An implicit assumption 
underlying these different manners of (and motivations for) 
endorsing administrative litigation is that a weak judiciary will 
undermine that institution, and that to enhance it, one needs to 
empower the judiciary. 
This Article, by analyzing the determinants of administrative 
litigation patterns in a context characterized by authoritarianism and 
a rule of law deficit, has questioned the justifiability of thus 
privileging the judiciary. It appears that the behaviors of litigants, as 
well as the laws that courts are supposed to enforce, have more 
explanatory power insofar as some core litigation outcomes are 
concerned.  Moreover, by highlighting the causes of the disuse of 
administrative litigation, it has questioned an even deeper and more 
widely-held assumption, namely that the rule of law should be 
identified with judicial constraints on the executive.  
This Article resembles previous revisionist scholarship that 
employs a generally applicable conceptual framework, combined 
with empirical analysis, to penetrate a self-enclosed, self-sustaining 
discourse about a particular legal system. For example, using similar 
methods, Professors Mark Ramseyer and Eric Rasmussen forcefully 
challenged “cultural models” of the Japanese legal system and 
common wisdom about litigation patterns in that system.
175
 The 
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discourse on Chinese administration litigation studied here is similar 
to the discourse Professors Ramseyer and Rasmussen criticize in that 
the discourses’ participants rarely consider whether the explanations 
offered can apply in other legal systems, or fare better than 
alternative explanations in predictive power. But the stakes in this 
study are higher, since the Chinese discourse about administrative 
litigation has been taken to inform thinking about the relationship 
between the rule of law and authoritarian regimes in general.
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